Four major marches in Paris between November and May, large demonstrations in a host of other cities and towns, daily and ‘spontaneous’ lightning demos throughout the period, and a media presence worthy of a Coca Cola or Nike advertising campaign, put millions of people onto the streets. For the final demonstration on 26 May, 500 buses and a dozen trains were hired to transport demonstrators from the provinces to Paris. Three massive processions from various points in the city each converged on and filled to overflowing the open space of the Place des Invalides. And this was after the bill had passed into law.

Who are they? Right-wing, yes, for the most part. All the far right groups you can think of, of which there are dozens – Génération Identitaire, the Gud, for example. But to concentrate on the movement’s radical elements for an explanation of what has happened would be to miss the movement’s significance. The movement has its ‘Neuilly’ aspect; Barbour jackets and Burberry scarves aplenty; and the deep involvement of Roman Catholic Church organisations – of the official 37 organisations constituting the Manif pour Tous, 15 were phantom organisations that didn’t really exist and most of the rest were linked to the Church.  (One of the most prominent, Civitas, even the Church shies away from). Along with the fundamentalist Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, and Jewish organisations, even some Buddhists have supported the movement.  But for the most part it was families – and in fact children by the thousands. And they were peaceful; they came, they demonstrated, they went home. Most of the arrests on 26 May (350 in all) were on the edges of the demo or because of fighting between the police and hard right groups afterwards.

The Home Secretary, Manuel Valls, told families not to come for their own safety. They came in their thousands.  For the 26 May demo there were 4,500 police on duty. We should add to this an equivalent number of the Manif’s own security and crowd control people, many of whom kept the hard right groups away throughout the day. That’s 9,000 people. It is true that the leadership of the movement has radicalised, sweeping its main spokeswoman, the eccentric but media friendly Frigide Barjot, to one side. But not since the 1930s has France seen its right materialise in this way. For the last 50 years, the French right has always been behind on everything progressive: decriminalising homosexuality, abortion laws, divorce, contraception, equal rights, and civil partnerships. And it has gained nothing from these rearguard struggles (Giscard’s reforms were only passed because the left voted for them). That isn’t the case with this protest. The large demonstrations have awoken or reawoken a Girondin France alongside the hard right. Revolutionary bonnets rouges, calls for liberty, and even talk of the Vendée genocide of 1793 have featured in these demos. Tout et n’importe quoi has poured into this protest movement, whose dynamic isn’t really about gay marriage at all. So why has this dreadful mess happened, and what will be the consequences?

Overall France is not anti-gay, probably less so than most countries. And there is a general tolerance on sexual and ‘lifestyle’ matters. The national majority in favour of gay marriage is significant. But the Manif pour Tous was fuelled by two things beyond its extreme right connections.

First, the movement has flourished in a national climate of utter exasperation with the government and the President. François Hollande is the most unpopular President France has ever had. Most of the French public look at the social protest and think ‘serves you right’. Public hostility to the Manif has been muted because it is an anti-Hollande movement. And if there were a true anti-Hollande movement it would contain about three-quarters of the country. Many are furious that the gay marriage bill has taken up so many hundreds of parliamentary hours to the detriment of finding solutions to the financial crisis the country is in.

Second, the French don’t know anything about Gender Theory. No one has read Judith Butler. What we might call political homosexuality, Gay Pride, is seen by many in provincial France as an Anglo-Saxon import. Over and above this, the legislation was seen by many as a Trojan horse for IVF-for-all and surrogacy, and therefore, for many, the commodification of children (and because of changes to the Code Civil, the wiping from their memory of their ‘origins’), and dramatic social and cultural changes as a result.  It won’t have dramatic effects at all, not at the wider social level, but it is a highly emotional subject in a country that sees itself as holding children and childhood as sacred.

The left has a large responsibility in allowing all of these things to coalesce into major social protest. All of the progressive legislation mentioned above came as a result of struggle, but also of debate. And on this issue there has been no debate. Over the last ten years the Socialists have debated nothing of interest, instead simply fighting one another like cats in a bag over who was going to be their presidential candidate. Hollande promised to heal the wounds of Sarkozy’s divisive rule, yet today France has never been so divided.

At one level, in his wildest dreams Hollande could not have hoped for more – a right-wing movement like the Manif pour Tous that has sent the right into turmoil, and has seen far-right rioters appearing everywhere and smashing everything. Surely, this could only profit the left. Well, that would be a serious miscalculation. It is true that the mainstream right was divided by the protest. It got involved, but has been riven with internal division as a result, and is effectively leaderless.

Marine le Pen and the Front National, on the other hand, have profited greatly – and will do so even more in the future. Officially, the FN did not associate with the protest. But the political constituency that the Manif has created may flock to the FN in the future. The political harvest for us all may be bitter weeds.

In the space of a few weeks, the social protest of provincial France has (re)created la France profonde as a political entity. One of the consequences of this is that French politics will soon take another forceful and unpredictable turn. Another, sadly, is that the left will now be extremely reluctant to introduce bold and progressive reforms for the foreseeable future. One can only hope that it uses the time for reflection and debate about the kind of society we want to live in.

Professor John Gaffney

This article has also been published on LSE EUROPP.

Download a sample of “Populism Watch” here.

Counterpoint’s Catherine Fieschi debates the matter of women in Italian politics in The Guardian

With UKIP rising in the polls, the media’s relationship with Farage appears to have undergone a marked change. Feeling guilty for dismissing his party at past elections, the press now seem to be doing their best to redress the situation. The problem is that the media – and everyone else for that matter – still struggle to know what to make of UKIP. They know what UKIP is not – on their view, it is not racist, or fascist, or like the BNP; neither is it quite like any of the main parties – but they find it hard to specify what the party is and how it should be treated.

One thing that seems pretty clear, however, is that UKIP’s condemnation of a corrupt elite and its claim to represent the genuine interests of the “pure” people mark it out as a populist party. In fact, one could argue that UKIP’s populism is even more important than its hostility to the EU – its website makes it clear that “the EU is only the biggest symptom of the real problem – the theft of our democracy by a powerful, remote political ‘elite’ which has forgotten that it’s here to serve the people.”

Counterpoint’s project “Europe’s Reluctant Radicals” has in recent months looked at populist movements in a variety of national contexts, from the Sweden Democrats toFrance’s Front National. For each country in our study, we have commissioned a leading writer to explore the “springs of populism” – the national myths, narratives and rituals that have made it possible for populism to succeed (or, in some cases, to fail).

In this context, UKIP’s brand of populism appears distinctly British – combining a traditional “Rule Britannia” patriotism (“stop knocking Britain!”, Nigel Farage urged at a recent Question Time debate, when another panellist argued that the UK is not as rich as Norway) and an outlook underpinned by a British sense of fair play. Their success is wrapped up in advocating symbolic measures – such as the simple act of making St George’s Day a national holiday, or the wider symbolism of Britain exiting the EU and regaining its status as an independent, proud country.

This is in part why the three main parties have struggled to hold UKIP back so far. In recent months, they have taken, in Tim Bale’s terms, the approach of “snogging” UKIP, and have shifted policy significantly on the issues that UKIP voters prioritise – in particular, immigration. But as Cas Mudde has argued, if a party “owns” a particular issue – such as Romanian and Bulgarian immigration – then if other parties try to compete on that issue it will not win them back votes. The Lib Dems seem particularly out of their depth here – having previously advocated an amnesty, they are now attempting to backtrack fast. And, in any case, a policy shift here and there will fail if they are not seen as having the symbolic power that UKIP wields.

On the other hand, is it possible for the Bulgarian and Romanian immigration issue to be the party’s undoing? For a party that says it deals in common sense, it might be embarrassing if very few Romanians and Bulgarians enter Britain next year. A recent short Channel 4 film of Nigel Farage in Bulgaria showed the UKIP leader struggling to find much evidence of Bulgarians wanting to come to the UK. Instead, most people shown on the video expressed a clear preference to remain in their home country. Farage said that economic logic meant that many would come in any case. The irony is that, in his strong belief that many Bulgarians will come to the UK next year, Farage gives the impression of disregarding the historic and cultural ties Bulgarians have to their own country – the very ties he unremittingly points to in the case of Britain. Or do Brits have a monopoly on national attachment?

Download Przygody Polaków z demokracją (In Polish)

If you would like a hard copy of the pamphlet, write to info@counterpoint.uk.com

Read an excerpt on Open Democracy – ‘The helpless and the resourceful, or the beginnings of Polish populisms’

Pamphlet description

Since the communist dictatorship crumbled in 1989, Poland has gone through powerful and uncontrollable changes: the old political system was replaced by democracy, and the Soviet centralized economy has changed to a market economy. Unsurprisingly, these fundamental changes in the political system and the market triggered shifts in all areas of social life.
Since 1989, Polish society has rushed into its new phase. Aspirations, models of collective and family relations, the education model, traditional hierarchical structures, lifestyles, gender roles in society, relationships to work, the concept of free time, the explosion of local memory, relationships in general, the composition of the political minority and majority, the rise of democratic individualism – all these changed at a rapid pace during the decade known as the Polish revolution, aimed at consolidating the ‘public good’.

But even if all these changes brought hope of a better life, they also encountered a powerful resistance. Since the early 1990s, some Poles have repeatedly shrieked  ‘enough change, stop time’; they come from varying political outlooks, including the nationalist left movements; and the Catholic Church has been actively involved. One of the strongest leaders of this resistance movement to change was Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who Beylin identifies as the pioneer of Polish populism.

Marek Beylin’s text discusses Polish society’s adventures with democracy and politics.

Photo by thisreidwrites

Counterpoint partners with the UCL European Institute for the discussion panel ‘The springs of populism in Europe: a crisis of democracy?’

The event will take place on the 10^th of May from 12:30 to 14:30 at the Christopher Ingold Ramsay Lecture Theatre (G21), Christopher Ingold Building, University College London, 20 Gordon St, London. There will be refreshments from 12.30 and the discussion will start at 13.00.

The speakers will include:

Michel Wieviorka, Director of the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’ Homme and Director of CADIS/EHESS from 1993 to 2009. He is the author of the Counterpoint pamphlet Le Front National (FN), entre extrémisme, populisme et démocratie

Othon Anastasakis, Director of South East European Studies at Oxford and Director of the European Studies Centre

Peter Kellner, journalist, political commentator and President of YouGov

Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European politics, University College London

Catherine Fieschi, Director of Counterpoint

One year before the European Parliament elections and European democracies are in turmoil. Political scandals, economic instability, and a perception of a ‘democratic deficit’ among European institutions are fuelling a crisis of democracy. Amid this instability, populist parties are performing well – from emerging neo-fascists like Golden Dawn in Greece to more established populist forces such as France’s Front National.

In this panel discussion, the speakers will explore how these populist movements constitute a lens for understanding the current political challenges facing Europe’s leaders. They will look at the specific social and cultural factors that have led to the success of populism – with a particular focus on France and Greece in perspective to the UK – and will discuss what deeper institutional problems the movements point to.

Click here to register

Entitled Le Front National, entre extrémisme, populisme et démocratie, the publication is part of the second phase of our ‘Recapturing Europe’s Reluctant Radicals’ project, supported by the Open Society Foundations. This stage aims to depict the intimate political and social terrain from which populism emerges, and consists of a series of ten expert country pamphlets exploring populism across Europe.

Michel Wieviorka’s ’s piece will be released at a discussion panel entitled ‘Le Front National : un défi jeté aux forces démocratiques ?’ 

About the author: Michel Wieviorka is Director of the Fondation de la Maison des Sciences de l’ Homme.  He was Director of CADIS/EHESS from 1993 to 2009 and was co-Director of Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie from 1991 to 2011.  He is the author of, amongst many other publications, Pour la prochaine gauche, Editions Robert Laffont, février 2011; Neuf de leçons de sociologie, Paris, Editions Robert Laffont, octobre 2008; Le printemps en politique–pour en finir avec le déclinisme, (dir.) avec Élie Barnavi, Alain Touraine, Elias Sanbar, Judit Bokser Liwerant, João Caraça, Isidro Cisneros, Nilüfer Göle, Pasquale Pasquino, Asaf Savas Akat, Simonetta Tabboni, Sergio Zermeño, Giovanna Zincone, Paris, Editions Robert Laffont, 2007; Le racisme–une introduction, Paris, La Découverte, 1998.

The event is organised in partnership with Sciences-Po/CEVIPOF,  and will be held on Thursday 18th of April, from 17:30 to 19:00 at 98 rue de l’Université, Paris. A reception will follow.

The panel includes:

Michel Wieviorka, Director of the Fondation de la Maison des Sciences de l’ Homme and author of Le Front National, entre extrémisme, populisme et démocratie (Counterpoint, 2013).

François Lamy, French Minister for Territorial Equality and Housing

Catherine Fieschi, Director of Counterpoint

Pascal Perrineau, Director of CEVIPOF

Click here to register.

In Le Front National, entre extrémisme, populisme et démocratie Michel Wieviorka argues that an effective opposition to the party must be based on precise and up-to-date knowledge, rather than solely on good intentions. He discusses the suitability of the different labels attached to the Front National over time -extremist, populist and nationalist- and investigates the new map of FN support:  no longer concentrated in ‘difficult’ cities or areas but rather coming from ‘peri-urban’ regions. The key question, Wieviorka asks, is whether this trend is likely to be reinforced in the near future.

Read an excerpt of Le Front National, in English, on Open Democracy

The event marks the launch of Marek Beylin’s Polish Adventures with Democracy (Przygody Polaków z demokracją), commissioned as part of Counterpoint’s project Recapturing Europe’s Reluctant Radicals, supported by the Open Society Foundations. The panel will discuss populism in the context of post-communist societies, with a focus on Poland and Russia. Speakers include:

Marek Beylin, historian, journalist and author of Polish Adventures with Democracy, editor at Gazeta Wyborcza

Eva Hoffman, academic and writer, author of Lost in Translation and Exit into History

Prof. Alena Ledeneva, Professor of Politics and Society at UCL SSEES and author of Can Russia Modernise?

Dr. Catherine Fieschi, Director, Counterpoint, author of In the Shadow of Democracy and co-author of ‘How to win back Europe’s populist vote’

Populism is not only a political form that is deeply intertwined with democracy; It is also a useful detector of a polity’s most intimate terrain, revealing both the functions and malfunctions of formal and informal institutions. With respect to post-communist societies, where political identities have been rapidly reshaped, populism is a particularly interesting lens trough which to interpret the scope and depth of change as well as the manner in which transition has shaped personal aspirations, political objectives and perceptions of success or failure.  The panelists will discuss these issues, drawing on the specific cases of Poland and Russia.

Read an excerpt of Polish Adventures, in English, on Open Democracy

Göran Rosenberg’s piece will be released at a launch organised in partnership with Arenagruppen, to be held on Thursday 14 March, from 15:00 to 17:00 at Drottninggatan 83, Stockholm, Sweden. A small reception will follow.

In ‘Sweden: the reluctant nation’, Rosenberg explores the hitherto limited success of populist movements in Sweden. This has been partly due to the historically remarkable success of the Swedish model and the concept of folkhemmet. In the early 1990s the Swedish paradise began to crumble. Collective obligations were weakened. And the rapid transformation from a culturally homogeneous nation to a society characterized by cultural and ethnic pluralism challenged the bonds of national cohesion. Thus the nostalgia for a “paradise lost” remains a powerful theme in Swedish politics. As Sweden still remains a reluctant nation, the Swedes still remain a reluctant people.

Read an excerpt from Sweden: a reluctant nation on Open Democracy

Chávez’s death forces a ‘reading’ of Latin American societies in light of his legacy.

Beyond musings and predictions on Venezuela’s immediate practical and geopolitical challenges, Chávez’s death forces a ‘reading’ of Latin American societies in light of his legacy.  What does Chávez tell us about Latin American societies and their politics? One of the key insights it provides is a powerful glimpse of the paramount sway that informal institutions and charismatic personal power still hold in most countries across the region.

Delving into Chávez is about revisiting the birth-place of populism – a way of re-grappling with the basic characteristics of the region that for many put in place the basic framework for populist politics. Hugo Chávez’s political trajectory highlights personal power – as a result of his very personal style, but also (and this reminds us of populism’s abhorrence of professional politics) because he was able to resort to informal networks and allies. He entered Venezuela’s national political scene in 1992 through a failed military coup. Six years later, he won the presidential elections, and two years after that made it clear that he was not leaving any time soon. Following a series of Constitutional amendments – some of which were supported by recurrent public referendums – he was able to again and again stand for re-election.  For years, Chávez overcame electoral opponents – most recently he beat Henrique Capriles, with 55 per cent of the vote – and vigorously confronted national and international critics.

This way of operating reminds us of what is core to populism: that politics is about them and us.

This way of operating reminds us of what is core to populism: that politics is about them and us, that setting up mechanisms to wrestle power from the elites at any cost is a respected (if not respectable) way of doing politics in populist terms, and that populist politics is not about policy, but about power and relationships.  The fact that much of this could apply to any form of democratic society tells us much about the deep relationship between democracy and populism. It also forces us to confront an obvious fact: that populism is a protean ideology and, basic tenets aside, is mainly gifted at embedding itself in specific contexts and making the most of democracy’s local and specific failures.  In this respect populism is also a very good lens through which to examine the most intimate terrain of a polity: its habits, its myths, its hidden levers and informal network and institutions.

Informal institutions and networks

In a region plagued by decades of authoritarianism and right-wing dictatorships and the resulting political and economic instability – the 1980s are known as Latin America’s ‘lost decade’ – various strategies have introduced and consolidated forms of democracy. While most countries – like Venezuela – took up arms and later rewrote constitutions that laid out formal mechanisms for fair party competition and guaranteed elections, others – like Mexico, where authoritarianism was not of a military type – democratised pragmatically. In the latter, a single party (the PRI) governed for nearly 70 years by constantly interfering with elections and making quick fixes to political rules when it suited them. The PRI took this route to maintain its electoral supremacy. These ‘selective choices’, all about where to allow democratic practices without jeopardising the survival of the regime, brought about electoral democracy.  The result was a failure to consolidate the regime within the framework of the country’s most important legal document, the Constitution.

Informal institutions remain embedded at the very core of society.

Whether democratic consolidation was guaranteed by constitutions or not, and whether it was achieved by a leader – like Lula in Brazil – or a movement – like Chile’s Concertación (the coalition that took over in 1988 when Pinochet was defeated) – it meant that informal institutions remain embedded at the very core of society. And given the nature of institutions (and particularly informal ones) as collective social norms, informal institutions also find themselves at the very core of public bodies. These range from grassroots organisations that help citizens overcome daily challenges – e.g. soup kitchens or issue-specific pressure groups during Perón’s time in Argentina – to closed groups of politicians who, by using mentor-disciple relations and personal connections, build networks and channels for their members to help each other increase their opportunities to access political power. (Roderic Ai Camp refers to these groups as Camarillas). And Latin American leaders excel at exploiting these.

One reaction might be, so what? Don’t all societies and political systems give rise to this form of behaviour? The answer is, yes, of course.  And yet, we still view the distance between formal institutions and informal institutions as a measure of democratic development. The greater the distance between the two, the greater the distance with procedural democracy.  The case of Latin America, and of Chávez’s Venezuela, reminds us that it is precisely procedural democracy against which populists rail.  More to the point in this case, it also reminds us that that distance can be bridged by a number of different forms of politics – pragmatic populism (in the case of Mexico), charismatic populism (in the case of Venezuela), bitter technocratic pills, in the case of Europe.

Throughout his time in power, but particularly since 2004, Chávez resorted to a wide array of informal channels to harness increasing support from the most impoverished sectors of Venezuelan society. The latter were the core supporters of the Bolivarian dream. As Ivan Briscoe writes, Chávez “proved exceptionally adept at agglomerating groups, forming coalitions, scenting opportunity and building a tremendous and durable power bloc; helped all the while by soaring oil prices.” He ruled as he saw fit, and used his friendly relations with China and Cuba to bring home policy solutions for defence, intelligence, education and health services. If formal rules had been stronger, these informally negotiated solutions would perhaps not have been possible; it is unlikely that he would have gotten away with leaving security and intelligence in foreign hands.

The perennial power of charismatic leaders

Charismatic leaders of Latin America have been the most effective mobilisers of the disadvantaged sectors of society.

Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and even electoral losers like Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico are examples of the iconic charismatic leadership figures of Latin America. These leaders have been the most effective mobilisers of the disadvantaged sectors of society. And in a region with high levels of inequality (figures for 2011 show that, in 18 Latin American countries, the wealthiest 10 per cent earned 32 per cent of the total income, while the poorest 40 per cent only received 15 per cent), the support from marginalised groups is electorally powerful.

Chávez won elections thanks to the overwhelming support of Venezuela’s poor, who regarded him as the saviour who ended their isolation from society by making education and health services – staffed by Cuban teachers and doctors – accessible to them.

What next for Chavismo?

Chávez’s governmental apparatus will have to find a way to keep the ship from sinking in a context in which the entire system was designed by Chávez, for Chávez. As his health considerably deteriorated last year, one of his last informal arrangements was to decree that vice president Maduro was to take over the presidency in his absence. This instead of sticking to Article 233 of the Constitution’s provision for the Speaker of the Assembly (Diosdado Cabello) to step in. Elections will inevitably take place in the near future, and it is yet to be seen whether Chávez’s party, the PSUV, can stay in power.

There is no doubt that Venezuela, like most other Latin American countries, will not go back to an authoritarian, military and violent model. The power of the military is weak in most Latin American constitutions and, though variations exist, most people believe that they are better off with democracy: in spite of a slight decrease in support for democracy in 2011 compared to 2010, (possibly triggered by the effects of the economic crises and changes in government and policies) 58 per cent of the population in Latin America prefer democratic governments to any other form of government.

Democratic consolidation and the taming of the populist beast can only go hand in hand with a lessening of inequality.

But an important question is whether gradual democratic consolidation in the region will eventually put an end to the iconic charismatic leader figure and the corresponding weight of ‘informality’. Possibly not. In many countries, the shocking 40 per cent of people who get only 15 per cent of the total national income are often locked in a vicious cycle of deprivation, like those living precariously on the steep hills of Caracas and to whom Chávez devoted his life and oil revenues, or, in fact, those who traded their vote for much-needed cash to Peña Nieto.  As anywhere else, democratic consolidation and the taming of the populist beast can only go hand in hand with a lessening of inequality.

Until then, it is likely that, at best, Chávez-style politicians will prevail.