Support for right-wing populism in Europe has steadily gained attention from media and policy-makers over the past decade. Most of this attention, however, has been focused on the core supporters of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) – the members and the street activists – at the expense of the topic of this publication, the ‘reluctant radicals’. These are our main protagonists: the soft, uncommitted supporters of RPPs. They are crucial for two straightforward reasons: the reluctant radicals are the bulk of RPP support as well as those who can most easily be brought back to the mainstream, thereby depriving RPPs of their main electoral base.

This publication is the first of a series produced within Counterpoint’s project ‘Recapturing Europe’s Reluctant Radicals’. Our aim here is to draw an accurate portrait of these voters by exploring the characteristics of the reluctant radicals in ten European countries, with a particular focus on France, Finland and the Netherlands. We aim to critically test some common assumptions – in particular, that right-wing populism is the preserve of disadvantaged young men – as well as outline the contours of the political and cultural context in which the data needs to be interpreted.

The result is a better understanding of the diversity of the support for these parties as well as a more accurate reading of the context in which they arise – the histories, traumas, memories, resentments and fears that drive the choices of the reluctant radicals.
Counterpoint is a research and advisory group that uses social science methods to examine social, political and cultural dynamics. With a focus on how civil society operates in different contexts, Counterpoint helps organisations to develop solutions for more resilient and prosperous societies.
Recapturing the Reluctant Radical: how to win back Europe’s populist vote

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All errors and omissions remain our own.

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Executive summary

Why the reluctant radicals?
The recent past has seen comment and analysis lavished on the dangers of right-wing populism in Europe. Most of this attention, however, has been focused on the core supporters of right-wing populist parties (RPPs, see page 16) – the members and the street activists – at the expense of what we call the ‘reluctant radicals’. These are the soft, uncommitted ‘supporters of RPPs’. Policy must focus on the reluctant radicals, for two straightforward reasons: the reluctant radicals represent the bulk of support for RPPs and they are the voters mainstream parties are most likely to win back. Similarly, little attention has been paid to ‘potential radicals’ – those people who do not yet vote for RPPs but are the most likely to do so in the future.

In this pamphlet, we explore the characteristics of the reluctant and potential radicals in ten European countries, with a particular focus on France, the Netherlands and Finland. We aim to critically test some common assumptions – in particular, that right-wing populism is the preserve of disadvantaged young men. While other research has suggested that the ‘hard core’ of RPPs and movements is in line with this typical profile, we wish to test the theory with respect to the reluctant radicals in particular. We draw on original data analysis as well as other expert research.
The method
We use the European Social Survey and national election studies to develop profiles of the reluctant radicals and the potential radicals. We divide our samples into four categories for each survey we use, broadly employing the following definitions:

- **Committed radicals**: people who vote for an RPP and say they are close to an RPP
- **Reluctant radicals**: people who vote for an RPP but say they are not close to an RPP
- **Potential radicals**: people who have views in line with right-wing populist ideology but who do not vote for an RPP
- **Mainstream**: the remainder of the electorate.

An initial sketch
Using the European Social Survey, we compare the reluctant and potential radicals in Germany, Denmark, France, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. We find that reluctant radicals make up a large proportion of right-wing populist voters – often at least half of right-wing populist voters are reluctant radicals. Potential radicals tend to extend far beyond RPP voters, suggesting that RPPs have a large amount of scope for broadening their electorate.

Using regression analysis, we find that men are more likely to be reluctant radicals than women in Germany and Finland, even when controlling for other factors. But in other countries – the Netherlands and Norway, in particular – the gender gap is small. In Germany, younger people are more likely than older people to be reluctant radicals, while in Denmark the opposite is true. Evidence for a relationship with unemployment is apparent only in Germany. Being a blue-collar worker increases the chance of being a reluctant radical in Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden.

Executive summary
Yet, across all countries, education rather than gender, age, or unemployment is the most consistent predictor of ‘reluctant radicalism’. Education appears to be the feature that distinguishes the reluctant radicals most reliably. We find only partial evidence that the typical profile of ‘young, male and disadvantaged’ applies to the reluctant radicals.

On the other hand, it is older, less educated people who tend to be potential radicals. And in France, women are in fact more likely to be potential radicals than men.

Turning to attitudes, we find that in nearly all the countries in our study, anti-immigration views increase the likelihood of being a reluctant radical. Distrust in parliament is also an important factor in Germany, Denmark, Finland France, the Netherlands and Norway. On the other hand, lacking trust in parliament increases the chance of being a potential radical in Germany and Norway. The alternative datasets that we use for the UK and Italy also support our findings.

France: the disconnected radical
What characterises the French reluctant radicals is their disconnection from almost every aspect of French life. They are geographically, educationally and politically removed from the mainstream and thus feel a permanent sense of insecurity, in combination with low levels of interest in politics. We find that there is a small gender gap: compared to the whole electorate, reluctant radicals tend to be male while potential radicals tend to be female. Education is an important cleavage: we find that 53 per cent of reluctant radicals have lower level qualifications, compared to the average of 39 per cent. Lower levels of education, combined with low levels of trust, a feeling of insecurity, and a relative concentration in rural areas suggest that reluctant radicals are a marginalised group.
The reluctant radicals are also politically disconnected, tending to have low levels of interest in politics. But their disengagement and uncertainty means they are more persuadeable: 62 per cent decide who to vote for a long time in advance, in comparison to 92 per cent of the committed radicals – which suggests that it is worth investing in persuading the reluctant radicals throughout an election campaign.

Finally, CEVIPOF’s electoral survey data from 2012 show that the Front National (FN) is a highly stigmatised party: 79 per cent of the FN voters hesitated to vote because they felt the candidate they voted for was stigmatised, compared to an average of 49 per cent for the whole electorate.

The Netherlands: the nostalgic radical
What characterises the Dutch reluctant radical is nostalgia for a particular, Dutch version of consensus politics (orderly, implicitly codified, pillarised) – rooted in 19th and early 20th century Dutch politics – combined with disdain for the current political elite and an unresolved attitude towards minorities in the context of a fluid party system. Right-wing populism in the Netherlands is shaped by the particularities (and recent history) of the Dutch political system and context, and in part by the peculiarities of the PVV itself. Geert Wilders has capitalised on the antagonism towards foreigners, and this is reflected in the views of the reluctant radicals: 61 per cent of reluctant radicals oppose the immigration of Muslims, compared to 31 per cent of the total electorate. Ninety-one per cent of reluctant radicals in the Netherlands believe that immigrants should adapt to Dutch culture instead of keeping their own, compared to an average of 60 per cent.

Both potential and reluctant radicals are disillusioned with the establishment, expressing low levels of trust in parliament. Political suspicion extends into wider social suspicion as well – only 49 per cent of reluctant radicals believe most people can be trusted, compared to an average of 64 per cent. As with France, committed radicals tend to decide who to vote for in advance of reluctant radicals.

The education gap has become an important cleavage in the Netherlands. Potential, reluctant and committed PVV supporters are significantly more likely to be educated at a lower level than average. Only 10 per cent and 4 per cent of reluctant and committed radicals respectively have been to university (vocational or research), compared to 31 per cent of the whole electorate.

Finland: the alienated radical
An appetite for a different kind of politics and difficulties in processing the rapid transformation of Finland in the past two decades seems to define Finnish reluctant radicals. While reluctant and potential radicals in France and the Netherlands are strongly motivated by anti-immigration attitudes, in Finland it appears that different factors are at play. The most common reason the Finnish reluctant radicals give for voting for the True Finns is to bring political change. Those who attach importance to the issue of immigration tend instead to be the committed radicals.

We find that the Finnish reluctant radicals tend to be working class and middle aged: 38 per cent identify as working class; 35 per cent are aged between 50 and 64, compared to 23 per cent of the whole electorate. We interpret the True Finns as the product of both a ‘crisis of modernity’ and, potentially, a ‘crisis of masculinity’ shaped by the particular Finnish context.
Why the reluctant radicals?

The prevailing narrative

In recent months, populism has filled the headlines. Politicians across Europe, faced with the crisis in the Eurozone, the elections in France and Greece and the tragic shootings in Utøya, have cautioned of a rise in the far right, extremism, and populism.¹ Think tanks, academics and commentators have repeatedly shown alarm that the continuing economic crisis in Europe will soon be matched with a political nightmare.

A common theme running through the commentary on right-wing populism is that a rise has been stimulated by the recession, the subsequent Eurozone crisis and severe austerity measures across Europe. Geopolitical intelligence company Stratfor commented that ‘times of austerity revive impulses toward nationalism and populism’.² A New York Times article noted in passing that ‘As the downturn deepens across Europe, the political right has risen in several countries, including France, the Netherlands and Hungary’.³ Attempting to explain Marine Le Pen’s high score in the first round of the French presidential election, Tim Stanley in the Telegraph wrote that ‘Under economic stress, people are like rats in a cage – and what else can a panicked animal do except bite and tear at the soft meat around him?’⁴ Comparisons are made regularly with the 1930s and the rise of fascism. At times this has veered towards hysteria. One commentator earlier this year went as far as to say, ‘like vermin in a time of pestilence, neo-Nazi groups appear to be enjoying a resurgence in a Europe plagued by increasing financial chaos and uncertainty’.⁵
Alongside this narrative a ‘typical profile’ of a right-wing populist party (RPP) supporter has emerged: young, often violent, poverty stricken and male. Reports of right-wing populism are regularly coupled with pictures of young men causing havoc. A number of reports and media outlets have caught young male right-wing populists in acts of violence: a Greek Golden Dawn spokesman slapping a female politician on live television; young men harassing Roma in the town of Gyöngyös in Hungary; English Defence League activists attending raucous demonstrations. A recent Guardian piece by Michael White lamenting the difficulties young military men face after leaving the armed forces drew further connections between extreme-right politics and troubled young men.

Some recent research has reinforced this image. Polling has shown that high numbers of young people are supportive of RPPs in France and Austria. The Demos report The New Face of Digital Populism showed that the online Facebook pages of right-wing populist movements across Europe are dominated by young men. In the UK, the image has been strengthened further by the anti-Islam English Defence League (EDL). By steering clear of the anti-Semitic and neo-fascist rhetoric of older forms of populism yet still maintaining strong associations with young male violence and football hooliganism, the EDL has given the impression that right-wing populism across Europe is the preserve of deprived and volatile young men.

In this pamphlet we will examine this narrative in a number of ways. First, we will note that while right-wing populism continues to pose a threat to political stability, to minority groups and to the legitimacy of institutions, it is questionable whether it has risen across Europe since the Eurozone crisis. Second, we will argue that the discussion of right-wing populism should focus less on the committed extremists and more on the ‘reluctant radicals’ – those ‘soft’ supporters who are likely to be easier to bring back into mainstream politics. Third, we will critically test the profile of the ‘reluctant radicals’ as being young, impoverished and male.

Before going further, we should briefly explain why we have chosen to use the word ‘right-wing populism’ in this pamphlet. Put simply, we think that the parties we are interested in are ‘right-wing’ by virtue of their belief in hierarchy and order. (This does not apply to their economic policies which, given Europe’s complicated relationship to liberal economics, may be, or appear, left-wing.) They are ‘populist’ by virtue of their militant anti-elitism, their glorification of ‘the people’, and their xenophobia. Some parties we include within this bracket – such as Golden Dawn – could be defined in stronger terms, such as ‘extreme-right’ or even ‘neo-Nazi’. By referring to the group as a whole as ‘right-wing populist’ we do not mean to dismiss the differences between the parties within the group or downplay the rhetoric and party programmes of the more extreme members. We use this term merely as a useful tool to talk about the group as a whole without assigning excessively heavy-duty labels such as ‘extreme-right’ to some parties. While Golden Dawn could be defined both as ‘extreme-right’ and ‘right-wing populist’, other parties such as UKIP or the True Finns could be named ‘right-wing populist’ but not legitimately be described as ‘extreme-right’. We wish to look at these parties too and so we use the term ‘right-wing populist’.

Challenging the narrative
The role of the recession and the financial crisis
Our first step in investigating the prevailing narrative settles on the issue of whether it is the financial crisis,
the recession and austerity that has provoked a rise in right-wing populism. It is clear why this view has become popular in some circles. The Front National (FN) scored its best ever result in the French presidential election under the leadership of Marine Le Pen and now has two deputies in the national assembly, the highest number since 1986. Against the expectations of many, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn sustained its high score of 7 per cent in the second Greek national elections of 2012. In the Netherlands, PVV leader Geert Wilders confirmed the power of right-wing populism by bringing down the coalition government that he had previously supported. No wonder the European mainstream is concerned – the populist right appears to be stronger than ever.

In fact, looking at the whole picture suggests this story is at best half-true. Yes, there have been some successes for right-wing populism since the financial crisis hit, notably in France, the Netherlands, Finland and Greece (though in France, Marine Le Pen’s score was only marginally higher than her father’s score in 2002, when Jean-Marie Le Pen’s vote was split between him and Bruno Mégret). But in other countries the populist right has struggled. In Italy, the Lega Nord have struggled in the wake of a party funding scandal followed by leader Umberto Bossi’s resignation. In the UK, the BNP has been hit by poor local election results, legal battles and lack of funding. In recent elections in Denmark, Norway and Switzerland, the right-wing populist vote has stagnated or fallen. Combined with the fact that many RPPs experienced some of their greatest periods of growth during times of economic prosperity – the Front National through the 1980s and 1990s, the FPÖ in 1999, and List Pim Fortuyn in 2002 – the evidence points to a picture that is more complex than a single comparison with the 1930s might suggest.
disillusioned young men, many of whom are members and activists. Further research into right-wing populism in the UK by Matthew Goodwin and Jocelyn Evans for Chatham House indicates that ‘whereas the less strongly committed BNP voters appear generally ambivalent about preparing for future conflict between groups, among more committed members there is clear evidence that they are more likely to consider preparing for conflict as a justifiable course of action’. The focus on committed supporters is largely down to the perception that they pose the greatest threat. And in security terms, it seems likely that they are the most dangerous. But what concerns us are the long-term, non-security related threats: the gradual undermining of representative institutions, the impact on mainstream parties, the – related – disproportionate toll on policymaking, the increasing toxicity of political discourse and, finally, the legitimisation of a set of political views through a slow but steady electoral success that takes its toll on a polity’s capacity to embrace diversity as well as other political challenges as a cohesive community. The sum of which provides further justification for mobilisation on the harder fringes of the party.

These are the threats posed by the electoral bulk of these parties over time, and this bulk is not accounted for – far from it – by committed supporters.

Studies have noted that right-wing populist supporters are a heterogeneous group. In France, the academics Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau have explored different groups within the Front National electorate, differentiating regular supporters from occasional ones. Joel Gombin of the University of Picardie Jules Verne has gone as far as to argue that one cannot speak of a single Front National electorate.

Analysts, policy-makers and politicians must shift their focus onto different citizens. This focus should be on the ‘reluctant radicals’ – not the committed hard core but the wavering, uncertain, soft supporters of right-wing populism. These people are crucial for the simple reason that they are the supporters to aim for in order to stop the ascent of right-wing populism. They are right-wing populism’s Achilles heel. Not only are there many of them – as we will demonstrate – but their reluctance makes them the easiest group of voters to bring back into mainstream politics.

RPPs might be right-wing populist but they are also parties – and like all parties they need to appeal beyond their core support base to win power. These parties need the reluctant radicals. Without them, they are consigned to the fringes. This is why RPPs have put so much effort into removing the stigma attached to them – to win over these voters. If RPPs take the time to court these voters, then so should mainstream parties.

Why, though, should one aim to undermine RPPs, one might wonder? Rather than focusing on their electoral expression, isn’t the task to eradicate the toxic views, the xenophobia and racism? And shouldn’t mainstream policy-makers concentrate on right-wing populism’s most violent expressions, rather than its political manifestation? We think this would be a mistake. The electoral success of RPPs itself poses a threat. The threat is threefold. First, RPPs can increase the salience of topics such as immigration and Islam, thereby dragging prejudice and closed-mindedness into mainstream political debate and legitimising an aggressive discourse around them. Second, right-wing populists polarise the political system, encouraging simplistic grand-standing rather than nuanced policymaking. Third, RPPs threaten the legitimacy of political institutions by offering a systematically destructive...
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account of any institutional failings or shortcomings. Europe (its politicians, policies and institutions) is a case in point: a complex set of institutions whose current troubles are held up by these parties as proof of the inherent fallibility of large-scale representativeness, cosmopolitanism and openness; as a lightning rod for grievances ranging from economic woes to joblessness to insecurity. And, finally, as a convenient elitist machine on which to hang conspiracy theories.

RPPs themselves present a danger to liberal democracies, not just the attitudes and violent acts they are associated with. By ‘recapturing’ Europe’s reluctant radicals and returning them to mainstream politics, this danger can be reduced.

If the mainstream wants to win back Europe’s reluctant radicals, it is no good treating them as pariahs. We must reach out to reluctant radicals by seeing them as co-citizens. Only by listening and understanding their concerns and grievances can mainstream activists and policy-makers hope to turn them away from right-wing populism. This means going beyond the convenient headlines and catch-phrases used by the RPPs and taken up by the media, and understanding how grievances and fears encapsulated in ‘anti-immigration’ or ‘anti-European’ views connect to a specific context (historical and cultural). How are the general pressures of global change, population flows, of which ‘Europe’, ‘immigration’, ‘crime’, ‘insecurity’ become the bogey-men, connected to specific national fears? And how can taking a measure of them allow us to elaborate better policy and a better offer for the reluctant radicals, without backtracking on tolerant, liberal principles? This is not just a vote-winning strategy for the mainstream – it is a moral appeal to not belittle the reluctant radicals and to give them a chance to return to the fold.

Some politicians, researchers and commentators have made a similar point, but combined this with an approach that makes a point of challenging liberal thought. On the right, former French president Sarkozy’s recent election campaign sounded tough on immigration and Islamic extremism in an attempt to woo Front National voters in the second round of the election. On the left, commentators in the UK have hinted that a party with an economically left-wing but socially conservative and anti-immigration programme may capture a new political centre ground. We do not recommend this approach here. Instead, while we urge the mainstream to re-engage with the reluctant radicals, we believe that this should be combined with an acknowledgement of some of the hard-won gains that multicultural policies have delivered over recent years.

Another important group of voters that we will discuss in this pamphlet are the potential radicals. These are the people who have not yet turned to RPPs themselves but are in the same pool from which these parties fish. If an RPP is to grow further, it will do so by capturing these voters. Just as it is vital to bring the reluctant radicals back into the mainstream, it is also essential for mainstream parties to keep the potential radicals from turning to RPPs. By reaching out to potential supporters of right-wing populism, the ascent of RPPs can be checked.

Spot the difference

But for effective policy on right-wing populism, a change in approach is needed. Policy-makers recognise that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not appropriate for public services, which call for adaptability to individual needs and backgrounds. A one-size-fits-all approach would also be mistaken for right-wing populism. As we will explore in the coming chapters, right-wing populism appeals to a diverse array of people. A policy
response for only one particular group will fail to deal effectively with this diversity.

Moreover, our understanding of right-wing populism should include not only the full range of its electorate, but also the range of social, cultural and political factors that influence their behaviour. Social science research can often neglect the roles of emotion, culture, national symbols, and collective narratives and myths, for fear of their being intangible and unquantifiable. Yet we think they play a crucial role, particularly when it comes to right-wing populism. In this report we intend to incorporate such factors into our analysis.

The voting process – which is what we have chosen to privilege in this phase of this three-part project – can also constitute an opportunity to express global or general fears and anxieties, filtered through the lens of a particular political culture and its formation at a given moment in time. A series of pieces by *Le Monde* journalists over the past year give a sense of the richness often encapsulated in the simple but privileged act of voting\(^2\) – the sum of aspirations, impressions and frustrations that lie beneath the vote. For one single voter, one of the journalists notes:

> In an uninterrupted flow of words, as unexpected as it was moving, [this man] told us about everything he was about to slide into his ballot envelopes on the 22nd of April and the 6th of May: five years of his life, the hope and pride of setting up his own business, the problems with debt, the arguments with the bank, the illness, pain and finally, death of his wife, the subsequent shame of a failed business, his bitterness, but also the strength of his friendships, a new love interest, the possibility of a fresh start, and his conviction that things needed to change.

All this is to say that strong emotions – both noble and less noble – irrigate and fuel voting patterns, channelled as they are by the institutions and culture within which they are shaped and exist. Acknowledging the emotional charge that goes into a vote and being discerning of this charge is a first step. The second is to interpret this charged behaviour in the context of a particular historical moment and politico-cultural context. This work will be done much more thoroughly in subsequent parts of the project. But it is useful and necessary for the purposes at hand to draw attention to some of the national specificities that emerge in our three key case studies and allow us to glimpse the specific silhouettes of our reluctant radicals in context.

Reluctant radicals in France, the Netherlands and Finland exhibit some similarities, but for policy purposes, it’s worth our pointing to some of the specifics – these emerge when we apply a cultural and historical lens to the data.

Three patterns emerge and are key for making sense of our reluctant radicals (and therefore for tackling right-wing populist support). We are not claiming that the key characteristics are exclusive to one type of reluctant radical or another, but rather that this is the dominant characteristic in a given context.

1. In France, reluctant radicals are defined by their disconnection – geographical, political, social and emotional. They are placed under the sign of disconnection, in a political culture that has promised the very opposite: a close and direct relationship to the body politic. For us, this deep chasm between the founding promise of France and the lived political experience is a key factor in understanding the French reluctant radicals and one to keep in mind when attempting to formulate policy.

2. In the Netherlands, the reluctant radicals emerge as deeply nostalgic. These are the people dealing with the rapid dislocation of a hitherto all-structuring
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party system (the symbol of social order and political efficiency) and the subsequent attempts to manage change and diversity in the absence of a framework that had privileged transparency and implicit rules (the famously open curtains of a society that prides itself on having nothing to hide). Against the backdrop of national trauma (the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh), this yields a reluctant radical who is both nostalgic of consensus and yet disdainful of current attempts to create a new one.

Finland, the case study most marked by rapid transformation over the past few decades, produces a reluctant radical defined above all by the plight of a marginalised Finnish male. As Finnish society continues its re-invention, the image of a somewhat discarded male figure belonging to a traditional Finnish landscape (both so close to the present and yet so distant) and unable to redefine his place in this new Finland looms large.

The Profiles
Given this approach, we need to look again at the typical right-wing populist profile.

In this pamphlet we will explore, using a wide range of datasets and expert opinion, the characteristics and attitudes of reluctant and potential radicals in France, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK. We will test this profile, not just for accuracy’s sake, but because at its heart the profile contains a moral question. If the profile is wrong, then those who adopt it encourage an exaggerated cliché. If researchers and party politicians do not know who the reluctant radicals are – and if this ignorance is supplemented with stereotypes – then we all fail to treat the reluctant radicals as citizens. This will only alienate them further. The same applies to the potential radicals. Therefore, as a first step to bringing the reluctant radicals back into mainstream politics and keeping the potential radicals from leaving, it is imperative that we do our best to understand who they really are.

Our study will focus on the socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes of RPP voters, as well as the macro-level cultural factors that trickle down to the individual level. ‘Supply-side’ factors such as the party system and the behaviour of RPPs themselves are also of course important in explaining the right-wing populist vote. In her book *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*, Elisabeth Carter argues that moderation of the centre-right party and greater convergence between the mainstream left and right can boost the support of extreme-right parties. She also suggests that party ideology and party organisation are important factors in explaining the variation in extreme-right success across Western Europe. While we will touch upon these supply-side explanations in our analysis, we focus primarily on the voters and not the parties. We do this because, while understanding the role of the party is important for explanations of extreme-right variation and useful for political strategy, our focus is crucial for policy-makers who want to engage with and confront the concerns of the voters themselves.

In the next chapter, we take a broad cross-country approach, exploring through quantitative analysis the consistencies and the contradictions within the profiles of the reluctant and potential radicals across ten European countries. In the following three chapters, we examine in greater depth the profiles in France, the Netherlands and Finland, understanding right-wing populist support within three very different cultural contexts. For France, we find that the reluctant radicals...
are ‘disconnected radicals’, separated both practically and politically from the rest of French society. For the Netherlands, we look at the ‘nostalgic radical’, within the context of a traditionally open and orderly society faced with great upheaval. And for Finland, we interpret the True Finns’ success through the ‘alienated radical’, lost within a country having undergone a transformation from an agrarian to a technology-led economy in a short space of time. In the final chapter, we draw together our analyses through developing recommendations on how to respond to the reluctant radical challenge.
An initial sketch

The method
A reluctant radical, we have said, is a supporter of an RPP who is not a member of the committed hard core. For the purposes of this pamphlet we operationalise this using the traditional concept of party identification. We divide voters of RPPs into two groups, according to whether they claim to identify with the RPP or, more weakly, say that they are close to the RPP. Party identification is a somewhat controversial choice of variable. While in the US it has traditionally been seen as a crucial factor in explaining voter choice, in Europe many have argued that in the context of growing party de-alignment and multiple party systems it at best plays a minor role and at worse is no different from voter preference. Nevertheless, as Jocelyn Evans has noted, it is still a useful way of delimiting the core vote of a particular party, and this is how we use the concept here. Whether party identification is understood as a semi-permanent psychological attachment or as a flexible reflection of current political feelings, we suspect it should serve as a reliable guide to differentiating strength of party support. We think this supposition is borne out by our analysis.

As for demarcating potential radicals, here we look at attitudes rather than voting patterns. Those who have attitudes in line with the populist right but do not vote for an RPP are defined as potential radicals. For this chapter, we focus on attitudes to immigration. For Western Europe this is the natural choice, since anti-immigration views are one of the defining attitudes of Western
European RPP voters. In Central and Eastern Europe this is not the case, but anti-immigration views can still provide a reasonable proxy for broader ethnocentric outlooks and, despite the low levels, many still hold strongly negative views towards immigration.

As a first step towards outlining the profiles of the reluctant and potential radicals across different countries, we use data from the European Social Survey on Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. We also compare these results with data from the British Election Study and ITANES with respect to Britain and Italy, bearing in mind that variation in survey methodology and question wording make any direct comparison difficult. We define four categories within the electorate:

- **Committed radicals**: people who vote for an RPP and are close to an RPP
- **Reluctant radicals**: people who vote for an RPP but are not close to an RPP
- **Potential radicals**: people who do not vote for an RPP but who are anti-immigration
- **Mainstream**: the remainder of the electorate.

### Composition of the electorate by type of radical

It is clear from this table that there are numerous potential votes for RPPs. This is less the case in Scandinavia, where anti-immigration views are less pronounced and where the views that are present tend to be absorbed by RPPs. But in other countries hostility to immigration extends far beyond the actual voters for RPPs.

But, exploring the RPP electorate, we find that in most countries the reluctant radicals make up at least half of those who vote for RPPs. In some cases – such as France – this figure is higher, while in Hungary the figure is relatively low. Reluctant radicals as defined here clearly make up a significant proportion of RPP voters. This is natural given declining levels of party attachment in Europe more generally. Further, RPPs are for the most part new parties that have had little time to build up strong connections with voters. The voters who are easiest to bring back into the mainstream make up a large proportion of the populist right. Targeting the
recruiting the reluctant radical is therefore likely to be a powerful strategy for tackling RPPs.

Who are they?
We first run a simple logistic regression to determine what socio-demographic factors influence the likelihood of being a reluctant radical, pooling together all five rounds of the ESS. We include gender, age, education level, unemployment and a measure for blue-collar workers in our analysis. We also look at cross-tabulations for the last round of the ESS where sample size permits. We performed similar analyses for Britain and Italy using the alternative datasets discussed above.

Not just a young man’s game
The gender gap with respect to right populist voting has been well documented. But our results tell us that the gender gap is in fact barely present for reluctant radicals in a number of countries.

In Finland and Germany, men are significantly more likely than women to be reluctant radicals. Our dataset for the UK indicates that men are also more likely to be reluctant BNP and UKIP supporters. It may be that men are more likely to be reluctant radicals for RPPs with a smaller base of supporters, such as the BNP in Britain and RPPs in Germany.

However, in other countries there is no evidence for gender having a relationship with reluctant radicalism, when other socio-demographic variables are controlled for. Cross-tabulations for Norway, the Netherlands and Italy (based on the fifth round of the ESS and ITANES 2008) underline the small or non-existent gender gap for the reluctant radicals in these countries.

With respect to potential radicals there is even less evidence of a gender gap, except in France where it is reversed — here, women are more likely than men to be potential radicals. Women are also more likely to be potential radicals in Italy and the UK (bearing in mind that different anti-immigration variables are used). Others have also shown that women are just as likely to hold anti-immigration or xenophobic attitudes as men, in spite of the fact that they are less likely to vote for anti-immigration parties. There appears to be a barrier between being a potential radical and a reluctant radical that blocks many women from voting, despite their attitudes.

If our reluctant radicals are not overwhelmingly men, is there a relationship with age?
Some previous research has pointed to younger people being more likely to vote for the populist right. Our results show that there are significant variations for the reluctant radicals across countries.

As a further illustration of the lack of a consistent pattern, in Germany, younger people tend to be more likely than older people to be reluctant radicals. But in Denmark, the opposite is the case. In Britain, using a separate dataset, we find that, similarly, older people are more likely than the young to be reluctant UKIP supporters. Meanwhile, in Finland, Norway, Sweden
and the Netherlands, there is no evidence that age is related to reluctant radicalism at all, at least when other socio-demographic factors are controlled for.

Analysing contingency tables reveals further inconsistencies across countries. In Hungary, reluctant radicals tend to be younger than average. In the Netherlands, there is evidence to suggest that committed radicals are younger than average, but this is not the case with respect to reluctant radicals. In Italy, reluctant radicals are more likely to be aged between 35 and 49 than the electorate as a whole. Our results are mixed, but one thing is clear: reluctant radicalism is not just a young man’s game.

### Age distribution in Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-49</th>
<th>50-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potential radical</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reluctant radical</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed radical</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS round 5

### Age distribution in the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-49</th>
<th>50-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
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<td>Potential radical</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant radical</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed radical</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ESS round 5

On the other hand, older people are more likely than other age groups to be potential radicals in Germany, Denmark, Finland, France and Norway, as well as in Britain and Italy with respect to our alternative datasets. As with gender, there is a remarkable disparity between attitudes and action.

Since older people consistently tend to be potential radicals – holding anti-immigration views but not taking action by turning to an RPP – we would expect that they would also be consistently more likely to be reluctant radicals. Yet this is not the case. Again, we find that, despite having anti-immigration attitudes, there is a barrier that prevents older potential radicals from crossing over and becoming reluctant radicals. They reject populist politics in spite of their views, not because of them.

Understanding the nature of this barrier is crucial to determining what allows those with anti-immigration attitudes into populist politics. That older people with anti-immigration attitudes appear to be less likely to make this leap suggests that it is their attachment to mainstream political parties that holds them back.
Education and work
A significant amount of research has confirmed that RPP supporters tend to be less educated than average.\textsuperscript{36} We find also that education levels are crucial to understanding the reluctant radicals. In Germany, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, low- or mid-level education is a good predictor of one's being a reluctant radical. Similar results hold in the UK for both the BNP and UKIP.

A notable exception is Hungary, where, by analysing contingency tables based on the 2010 election, we find that only 6 per cent of reluctant radicals are educated to a low level, compared to 21 per cent of the electorate. Other recent research on the Hungarian RPP Jobbik paints a similar picture.\textsuperscript{37}

Low- or mid-level education is also a strong predictor for potential radicals: those with a lower level of education are more likely than highly educated people to be potential radicals in Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Norway. The same applies using the different datasets in Britain and Italy.

Previous research has indicated that workers and the lower middle class are the core social groups for RPPs and that the unemployed are more likely to vote for the populist right.\textsuperscript{38} In Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden, our regression indicates that blue-collar workers are indeed more likely than others to be reluctant radicals.\textsuperscript{39} In the UK, according to the table below, reluctant BNP and UKIP supporters are more likely than the whole electorate to be manual workers.

On the other hand, in Italy our regression does not indicate that manual workers are more likely to be reluctant radicals. The self-employed, however, do tend to be reluctant radicals: this is the traditional right-wing populist vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation in Britain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential radical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant UKIP supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed UKIP supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant BNP supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed BNP supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BES 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation in Britain</th>
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</table>
of the petit bourgeoisie. The table below demonstrates the class spread of the Italian reluctant radicals.

### Occupation in Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation in Italy</th>
<th>Not in employment (%)</th>
<th>Executives (%)</th>
<th>Teachers (%)</th>
<th>Managers (%)</th>
<th>Senior managers (%)</th>
<th>Manual workers (%)</th>
<th>Self-employed (%)</th>
<th>Atypical workers (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential radical</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant radical</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed radical</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>All</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ITANES 2008

Within the countries analysed using the ESS, there appears to be little relationship between unemployment and reluctant radicalism, at least when controlling for the other factors already discussed. The one exception is Germany, where unemployed people are more likely to be reluctant radicals. Furthermore, in Britain, using different data, 8 per cent of reluctant BNP supporters say they claim job seekers’ allowance as their main source of income, compared to 1 per cent of the electorate.

The most consistent predictor of being a reluctant radical is not being male, young, unemployed or even working class – it is being less well educated. It is education that marks out reluctant radicals from others.

**Immigration frustration and depleted trust**

By running logistic regressions for each country, we try to determine what attitudes single out reluctant radicals, while controlling for age, gender, unemployment and education level. We build a repeatable model for each country to examine how extreme-right ideology, attitudes to immigration, trust in parliament and political interest impact on reluctant radicals.

Even while controlling for socio-demographic variables, these attitudes appear to play a vital role across many of the countries in our study. Those who position themselves on the far right of the political spectrum are more likely to be reluctant radicals in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway; while concern over immigration increases the chances of reluctant radicalism in Germany, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands, as well as in Italy and the UK, using different survey data. The exceptions are Finland and Hungary, where RPPs have tended not to focus on the issue of immigration.

While research has shown that the effects of cultural grievances over immigration consistently outmatch the effects of economic grievances over immigration on the populist right vote, our analysis shows that, in all the countries in our ESS study other than Sweden and the Netherlands, both economic and cultural concerns are predictors for being a reluctant radical. In Sweden (and also Italy, though results are not directly comparable), greater concern over the cultural effects of immigration increased the likelihood of being a reluctant radical. In the Netherlands, this was true with respect to the economic effects of immigration. But, in general, economic and cultural concerns went hand in hand.

Before moving forward, we make a short note on immigration. The research we have carried out shows that negative attitudes towards immigration are strongly correlated with support for RPPs. This comes as no surprise. But readers might wonder why we don’t spend more time on this issue. The answer is two-fold. One reason is that negative attitudes towards immigration are, sadly no
doubt, extremely widespread and while they correlate strongly with RPP support, they permeate the whole of the political spectrum. In many respects, while the link is stronger with RPPs, it is far from exclusive. Policy-makers focus on negative attitudes towards immigration precisely because they are not the preserve of RPPs.

But mainly, our reason for not focusing more on the link between reluctant radicals and negative attitudes towards immigration goes back to the underpinnings of this study – the idea that while the correlation is interesting, what we are interested in is the texture, the context-specific ways in which this attitude gets shaped. Understanding how the issue of immigration is instrumental in building support for RPPs can occur only if we look at the much more contextual variables – the isolation, the disconnection, the nostalgia. Only then does the actual ‘content’ (and therefore, meaning) of the negative attitude towards immigration appear, and only then can there be an adequate policy and political response.

The political scientist Hans-Georg Betz has argued that radical right-wing parties have benefited from the long-term disintegration of social bonds in Western countries. In our study, we find that trust and lack of political interest are significant predictors of reluctant radicalism in a number of countries.

In Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Norway, people who have less trust in parliament are more likely to be reluctant radicals. Similar findings hold in Italy and the UK with regard to the BNP and UKIP. Unsurprisingly, anti-EU attitudes are also a strong predictor for reluctant BNP and UKIP supporters, though we were able to test this only in the UK. In Norway (as well as Italy, bearing in mind different variables are used), those who are not interested in politics tend to be reluctant radicals.

Lack of trust and lack of interest in politics are important characteristics for the potential radicals too. Running the same analysis using the ESS but for potential radicals rather than reluctant radicals, we find that less trust in parliament increases the likelihood of being a potential radical in Germany and the Netherlands. In these two countries, as well as Hungary, we also found that those with low interest in politics were more likely to be potential radicals.  

Europe’s reluctant radicals: the amended profile

Our results show that in many cases the reluctant radicals (and sometimes the committed radicals) only partially fit the typical profile. Men are more likely to be reluctant radicals in only some countries, and often the gender gap is fairly small. Young people in most countries are not more likely to be reluctant radicals. And, education is the most consistent predictor of being a reluctant radical – far more so than gender, age or unemployment.

Where the typical profile is most accurate, it is with respect to smaller RPPs, such as the BNP in the UK or RPPs in Germany, that have failed to capture appeal beyond a small group of voters. Where RPPs have successfully reached out to more voters, the typical profile has been diluted.

Our analysis suggests that the reluctant radicals are more ‘ordinary’ than one might think. Other than attitudes, a lower level of education is the most consistent predictor of being a reluctant radical across the countries in our study. There is no striking, consistent relationship with gender and age. Our findings give us no reason to treat these voters as anomalies. We have seen that uncompromising anti-immigration attitudes and a lack of trust in parliament may motivate people to become reluctant radicals. But this does not mean that they should be treated as aberrations.
Europe’s potential radicals: a barrier between attitudes and action
On the other hand, older and less well-educated people tend to be potential radicals, but there is an even split in terms of gender – in fact, in some countries, women are more likely to be potential radicals than men. This indicates that there is a barrier between being a potential radical and a reluctant radical – between attitudes and action. This is a barrier that women and older people appear to find particularly hard to cross.

The potential radicals are often ignored when it comes to understanding and responding to right-wing populism. But they are crucial for the sustainability and growth of RPPs.

Yet due to the broad-brush approach and the great variation across countries our analysis so far does not give us the full story, even though it is an important first step. We need to dig deeper to develop a greater understanding of reluctant and potential radicals. In the following chapters we look more closely at right-wing populism in France, the Netherlands and Finland.
France:
the disconnected radical

The Front National is a party of paradoxes. It is steeped in history, an increasingly undeniable presence on the French political scene for four decades, but is nevertheless a permanently marginal force. It has been described as ‘structurally unstable’, but has arguably engendered surprising loyalty. Its vote share has been both severely underestimated and severely overestimated. It has apparently received support from young and old, from urban centres and rural areas, from the petit bourgeoisie and the unemployed. It is a party that is hard to pin down.

Yet it is a party that continues to pack a punch.

Founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972, the party emerged from the shopkeepers’ anti-tax Poujadist movement of the 1950s and the resistance against Algerian independence of the early 1960s. The Front National rose to prominence in the 1980s after successes in local and European elections and – for the most part – over the decades slowly increased its share of the vote, despite numerous controversies, internal disagreements and raucous splits.

In 2011, Le Pen’s daughter, ‘Marine’ to her admirers, became leader. Le Pen aimed to eliminate the stigma attached to the FN in earlier years by promoting a milder, more inclusive party. Distancing herself from her father’s provocative anti-Semitic statements and rejecting more extreme alliances, she focused on winning power, her attacks aimed at bankers and Brussels along with the FN’s old enemies of Islam and immigration. As pointed out by Pascal Perrineau, Marine Le Pen continued to have recourse to all the far
right’s fundamentals (referring to ‘murderous globalisation’, Islamism, corrupt elites, and so on), but she also attempted to introduce a number of themes designed specifically to integrate the party into the mainstream French political landscape. In order to do this, she turned to the traditional French themes of Republicanism, secularism, the Rights of Man and the protector state. All of these had hitherto been the standard bugbears of a French far right still ill at ease with the Revolution itself, with the militant secularism that is French laïcité, with a large state and with the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which had largely been seen as a creation of the left and symbolic of the destruction of the natural order of the Ancien Régime.\textsuperscript{48}

Did her strategy pay off? From the result itself it is hard to tell. Her score – 17.9 per cent – was high – the highest a Front National leader has ever received in a presidential election. But, given France’s disillusionment with Sarkozy and its ambivalence towards Hollande, as well as the potentially explosive Mehra shootings in Toulouse, it is hard not to entertain the thought that it could have been much higher.

Le Pen’s success on this front, we acknowledge, can be measured only further down the line. Indeed, it is important to place Marine Le Pen in a particular perspective when it comes to the party’s future evolution: one that is probably closer to ex-FN grandee Bruno Mégret’s (whose aim was to turn the party into a robust mainstream right) rather than to that of her father’s (which was dominated by the desire to maintain the party’s distinctiveness, at the expense of longer-term success). Marine is in it for the long game – trying to build a broader base and alliances with the mainstream right, rather than focusing on short-term gains. Either way, however, it is difficult to detect much success in terms of detoxification: the party is still perceived as ‘dangerous for democracy’ by a large majority of French people, and the hoped-for six seats in the parliamentary elections did not materialise. The problem for Le Pen lies in part with the fact that the mainstream right did not implode to levels which might have made alliances with the FN a necessary evil.

The numbers
Our analysis in this chapter uses electoral data to explore a number of characteristics of the French reluctant radicals. What emerges most strongly is their disconnectedness from the rest of French society – whether it is through where they live, what they think of others, or how they interact with politics. This disconnection is all the more intensely felt in a society where one’s connection with the state is of paramount importance. On many levels, we find a ‘gap’ between the reluctant radicals and others.

We use CEVIPOF’s post-electoral survey of the 2012 presidential election, conducted by OpinionWay and provided by CEVIPOF, to analyse and compare potential, reluctant and committed radicals. The data will be available at the Sciences Po Centre for Socio-Political Data. We define reluctant radicals much as we did with respect to the analysis in Chapter 2. To achieve a better sample of potential radicals, we define this group using a greater variety of attitudes than with respect to the last chapter. We include attitudes on immigration, authority, insecurity and Europe, all key issues that set FN voters apart from others.

We also run two logistic regressions: first, a regression that compares the French reluctant radicals with those who do not vote for the FN, controlling for gender, age and education level; and, second, a regression that compares reluctant radicals with committed radicals, controlling for the same socio-demographic variables.
In the former case we look at what makes someone a reluctant radical as opposed to not voting for the FN – what ‘push factors’ propel them to vote for the party. In the latter case we look at what makes one a committed radical rather than a reluctant radical – what factors inspire the loyalty that makes it hard for these voters to be won back.

**A diminishing gender gap**

In the last chapter, we explored how a barrier appeared to prevent many women who agreed with right-wing populist ideas from taking the next step of voting for them. Nonna Mayer has argued that Marine Le Pen has successfully broken down this barrier, attracting new female voters. In fact, our analysis shows that the gender gap for Marine Le Pen’s reluctant radicals appears to be fairly small, if not negligible: 53 per cent of reluctant radicals are male, while men make up 48 per cent of the electorate. With regard to the potential radicals, however, the traditional gap is reversed: 64 per cent are female. This suggests there is still a gap of sorts: if so many women are potential radicals, shouldn’t a similar proportion vote for the FN? Female voters appear to be less willing to abandon mainstream parties. One possibility noted by Kai Arzheimer is that it is an extremist image that puts women off RPPs, provoking mental associations with the military violence of the extreme right of the 1930s and 40s. This could be part of the story: women find the masculine ‘warrior’ image of RPPs – whether intended or not by the parties themselves – fundamentally unappealing. If so, the diminishing gender gap could suggest that Marine Le Pen’s ‘detoxification’ strategy has had at least some success.

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### A yawning education gap

If the traditional gender cleavage is barely present, then it barely registers in comparison to the cleavage in education levels. We find that the reluctant radicals are less well educated than average. Fifty-three per cent have lower level qualifications as their highest qualification (the BECP, CAP or BEP), compared to an average of 38 per cent, and they are less likely to have obtained the baccalaureate. However, we should bear in mind that 21 per cent have no educational qualifications, similar to the average of 17 per cent.

#### Interest in politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Quite a bit</th>
<th>A little</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potential radical</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant radical</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed radical</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>41</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEVIPOF’s post-electoral survey of the 2012 presidential election; June 2012; survey conducted by OpinionWay

### A political gap

The reluctant radicals are not just cut off from higher education: their ‘disconnectedness’ is also mirrored in the sphere of politics. While committed radicals appear to be highly interested in politics, reluctant radicals (who make up the bulk of FN voters) are less interested than average. This suggests an important difference between the reluctant and committed radicals: while the committed radicals seem to be politically in tune, voting confidently and attentively for the FN, the reluctant radicals appear to be highly disengaged. This is reflected in the differences between reluctant committed radicals
with regard to when they decided to vote: 92 per cent of committed radicals decided who to vote for a long time in advance, compared to 62 per cent of reluctant radicals (similar to the average figure).

A social gap
Not only do reluctant radicals display low levels of trust in the state, trade unions and the national assembly; they also have low levels of trust in people more generally. Only 12 per cent have trust in others, compared to 27 per cent of the electorate as a whole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of residence</th>
<th>Rural area</th>
<th>In a city of 2000 to 20,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>In a city of 20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>In a city of 100,000 inhabitants or more, in the provinces</th>
<th>In the greater Paris area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Reluctant radical</td>
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<td>Committed radical</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEVIPOF’s post-electoral survey of the 2012 presidential election; June 2012; survey conducted by OpinionWay

A geographical gap: the new peri-urban radical
The marginalisation of the reluctant radicals in this election also manifests itself in more practical terms. Thirty-three per cent of the reluctant radicals are from rural areas, compared to 26 per cent of the whole electorate. Analysis by Joel Gombin at the University of Picardie Jules Verne shows how Front National support has moved from urban to rural and peri-urban areas in the past two decades, a shift that he attributes to urban sprawl. Gombin notes how Le Pen support has decreased in the Île-de-France region around Paris but has increased in areas just outside the region, explaining that:

*These scores cannot be attributed only to people moving into these regions. It is also a consequence of such changes on the countryside, on living conditions, housing, the local job market and access to public goods and services.*

More pressure on resources such as transport and housing has further disconnected the French reluctant radicals from the rest of society.

‘Liquid modern’ radicals
Given their marginalisation, it is no surprise that one of the French reluctant radicals’ greatest concerns is ‘insécurité’. The FN has consistently campaigned on the issue for decades. ‘Insécurité’ refers mainly to crime, but it also has associations with unemployment – economic insecurity – and a more general feeling of political, social and cultural unease. Sixty-three per cent of reluctant radicals say they do not feel secure anywhere, compared to an average figure of 38 per cent. Nonna Mayer has argued that before the 2002 presidential election ‘a general feeling of insecurity, both social and economic’ helped boost the FN vote.

In Liquid Modernity, the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman argues that insecurity – in its widest sense – is a core feature of contemporary (‘liquid modern’) society. Globalisation, flexible labour markets, short-termism and rampant individualism and consumerism have led citizens to a perpetual state of uncertainty. This manifests itself in a deep fear of ‘stalkers’, ‘prowlers’ and ‘strangers’:
‘Do not talk to strangers’ – once a warning given by worrying parents to their hapless children – has now become the strategic precept of adult normality. This precept recasts as a prudent rule the reality of a life in which strangers are such people with whom one refuses to talk. Governments impotent to strike at the roots of the existential insecurity and anxiety of their subjects are only too eager and happy to oblige.

The anxiety of the French reluctant radicals can therefore be seen as a product of late modern society. Some support for this thesis is given by our regression analysis, where we see that concern over globalisation is one factor that increases the chances of being a reluctant radical as opposed to not voting for the FN. These fears and insecurities about the unstable nature of modern life are important factors in the rise of the Front National, extending far beyond a simple diagnosis of unthinking xenophobia.

The relationship to Bauman’s version of life in liquid modernity is further in evidence when we take into account the reluctant radicals’ key relationship to work: they tend to be of working age (although, as we have just noted, this finding is inconsistent with other surveys), and are more likely than average to be either unemployed or in full-time work, and less likely to be retired. Work or the quest for work is central to their life. Again, this illustrates Bauman’s analysis, in which ‘liquid modern’ society places greater insecurity on those who are economically active by imposing precarious short-term contracts and the persistent threat of redundancy.

This does not mean that the French reluctant radicals are economically on the left, however. Fifty-five per cent agree that to establish social justice you need to take from the rich to give to the poor, compared to 61 per cent of the whole electorate. Neither is there evidence for the common thought that there is a large overlap between the radical left and right. In fact, the reluctant radicals are strikingly unsympathetic to Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Thirty per cent say they have no sympathy for him at all on a scale from 0 to 10, compared to an average figure of 18 per cent.

An erratic electorate?
Patrick Lehingue has argued that the FN electorate is structurally unstable and that only four features consistently set it apart from others: gender, education level, political efficacy and interest, and xenophobic and authoritarian attitudes. Other factors over the past 30 years have been markedly unhelpful or fluid predictors. A prime example of this is age. Nonna Mayer has noted that in 2002 older people were more likely to vote for the FN, while in 1995 young people were more attracted to the party.

In our analysis, we see that reluctant radicals are more likely than average to be aged between 35 and 49 and less likely to be aged over 65. But this is not consistent with all surveys taken before the 2012 election. It appears that age is a poor predictor of FN voting, varying from survey to survey. Claims that young people are voting in large numbers for Le Pen should be taken with caution, particularly as they are often based on surveys with a small sample of young people.

While there are a number of inconsistencies in the FN vote, research also indicates that FN voters have been remarkably loyal. According to survey data, 84 per cent of FN supporters in 1988 voted again for the party in 1993. These findings are disputable because they are based on voters being able to recall their vote preference from previous elections. Yet, even if they are accurate, it is still clear that over the past two decades the FN has branched out (literally, when it comes to the rural and peri-urban vote), attracting new voters and driving structural changes in their electorate.
A toxic brand? Shame, stigma and the Front National voter

This returns us to the question of whether the 2012 election was a turning point for the FN. Did Marine Le Pen achieve much through her de-demonisation strategy? We asked voters a number of questions in the PEF 2012 on their reservations about voting. We asked whether they were put off voting for a particular party because they saw it as extreme, because they were worried what their friends and family would think, or because the party was stigmatised.

The relationship between reluctance and shame is particularly interesting because it reveals a somewhat contradictory stance – itself revealing of a peculiar relationship to the act of voting. Or at least one that is mediated by a storm of emotions.

As we expected, FN voters are more likely than average to express reservations about their vote. Strikingly, 79 per cent of FN voters hesitated to vote for their candidate because they felt the party was stigmatised, compared to an average of 49 per cent for the whole electorate. It seems fairly clear from this that Marine Le Pen’s efforts to de-demonise the FN have not been completely successful.

Surprisingly however, this concern is not matched by strong feelings of shame. In fact, shame does not appear to be strongly associated with FN voting. When we divide FN voters into reluctant and committed radicals, however, we find that committed radicals are both more likely to be very ashamed and more likely to be very proud of their vote than average. Five per cent of committed radicals are very ashamed of their vote, compared to an average of 1 per cent; while 36 per cent of committed radicals are very proud, compared to an average of 16 per cent. This may be because committed radicals are more attached to their party, and therefore their party’s brand is more likely to have a greater psychological impact on them, forcing them to the extremes on such a question. In particular, the greater level of pride suggests that – with respect to the committed radicals, at least – stigmatisation can make FN voters more resolute in their voting decision. They may know that what they are doing is seen as wrong, but relish doing it anyway.

### Pride or shame in voting in the first round of the 2012 presidential election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very ashamed</th>
<th>Somewhat ashamed</th>
<th>Neither ashamed nor proud</th>
<th>Some-what proud</th>
<th>Very proud</th>
<th>Refused</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Le Pen voters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEVIPOF’s post-electoral survey of the 2012 presidential election; June 2012; survey conducted by OpinionWay
A gap between the individual and the citizen

This peculiar relationship between stigma, opprobrium, shame and pride for the French FN voters warrants some unpacking since it seems to point to a profound internal disconnection. As pointed out above, the numbers show that the strong sense of potential stigmatisation is not matched by feelings of shame. A number of scenarios emerge concerning the springs of such electoral behaviour:

- It could illustrate deep concern combined with a strong need for transgression, subsequently dealt with by actively denying any strong sense of remorse or shame post-vote.
- It could also illustrate a deep ambivalence that is expressed by concern pre-vote, followed by relative ease post-vote (in other words, an inability to relate particularly coherently to one's behaviour or political beliefs).
- Or it could be a combination of both.

It also points to the relationship between shame (the hesitation and sense of opprobrium before the vote), its capacity to generate rage (the casting of the vote fuelled by rage and the desire to reclaim a voice in the context of a sense of inferiority and loss of recognition and disconnection) and, finally, defiance or denial, depending on the individual and the strength of their relationship to the party. All this can serve as a further potential illustration of the myriad ways in which French reluctant radicals suffer from forms of deep disconnection that run from the practical to the emotional and psychological.

In no other country do we find this particular combination of stigma and pride. It suggests a particular form of marginalisation and disconnection that is deeply related to the feelings of shame resulting from perceptions of threat to the social bond, the fear of being cast adrift and rising sentiments of isolation and worthlessness.

Shame, Helen Lewis argues, can be seen as a response to the threat of disconnection from the other. It can also immediately turn to anger (the notion that one responds to humiliation by fighting).

In a society, a republic, in which the political bond between the state and the citizen is traditionally formulated and represented as all-encompassing, privileged and almost metaphysically direct, a sense of disconnection – especially on so many levels – is traumatic and deeply at odds with the imagined, mythical country. This disconnection is capable of fuelling erratic, yet sustained, political behaviour.
In April 2012, Geert Wilders, founder and leader of the right-wing populist PVV, forced the Dutch government to fall. In a country which decades before had a sturdy democracy built around consensus and a reputation for tolerance and stability, a formidable anti-Islam populist made his mark. Wilders had broken through into mainstream politics – first by supporting the minority coalition, and then by pulling out, not because of his initial core issues of immigration or Islam, but due to budgetary disagreements. Not only that, he provided a model of right-wing populism for the rest of Western Europe, a tried and tested method that set him apart from the old radical right.

Using the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary Election study, we replicate the method used in the last two chapters to achieve a similar categorisation. Reluctant and committed radicals are defined approximately as we defined them earlier. Potential radicals are defined as those people who did not vote for the PVV in 2010, but who agree with the party on one of its core issues – its hatred of multiculturalism.

To fully understand the rise of Wilders and the PVV, however, we must look further back. Twenty-first-century right-wing populism in the Netherlands began with the sudden success of populist leader Pim Fortuyn and his death at the hands of an animal rights activist. Dutch politics was stirred by Fortuyn – a former sociology professor whose fierce populism, energetic criticisms of Islam and multiculturalism and unguarded
homosexuality made him a tremendously popular and unusual type of right-wing populist.

In *Murder in Amsterdam*, journalist Ian Buruma provides a powerful insight into Fortuyn's success.

In his [Fortuyn's] vision, a national community should be like a family, which shares the same language, culture and history. Foreigners who arrived with their own customs and traditions disturbed the family-state... What mattered in the ideal family-state wasn't class, it was 'what we want to be: one people, one country, one society'.

This antagonism towards foreigners – in particular those who do not share the same culture – has also been capitalised on by Wilders, who left the centre-right VVD in 2004 in disagreement over Turkey's membership to the EU, forming his own one-member party soon after. Sixty-one per cent of Wilders' reluctant radicals oppose the immigration of Muslims, compared to 31 per cent of the entire electorate. In fact, those PVV voters who oppose immigration are more likely to be committed radicals.

**Agree or disagree: the immigration of Muslims should be stopped**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fully agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Fully disagree</th>
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<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant radical</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed radical</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010

The roots of this anger are actually deeply conservative. This is missed when Wilders and Fortuyn are summarised as libertarians due to their defence of women's rights and opposition to homophobia. It is true that Fortuyn argued for a defence of Enlightenment values against the threat of 'backward' Islamic culture, blending social liberalism with populism. (It is not surprisingly that the Dutch committed radicals are less religious than average.) But Fortuyn's appeal lay in part in his offering to the electorate what Buruma calls 'a nostalgic dream born of his own sense of isolation'.

**Nostalgia**

That 'nostalgic dream' has not been forgotten. Ninety-one per cent of the Dutch reluctant radicals believe that immigrants should adapt to Dutch culture rather than keep their own, compared to 60 per cent of the whole electorate. A predominant feature of the Dutch right populist electorate is an inclination towards the preservation of culture – a fundamentally conservative instinct.

It is important to understand the power that this nostalgic dream has over the Netherlands, in particular over the supporters of both the (now dissolved) List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and PVV. A number of writers – Buruma quite successfully but academics such Mair and Daalder as well – have captured the dislocation of the Dutch political landscape in the aftermath of what in effect was the abrupt disappearance of traditional political party structures in the 1970s. While it may seem strange to hark back three or four decades for the roots of PVV support, it is crucial to do so, since the disappearance of the pillars isn't just about a transformation of the party system, but about the ushering in (as well as the reflection of) a deep transformation of Dutch society and politics, and what is as of now a still
unfinished transition. The 1970s mark the beginnings of a transition from a segmented but orderly polity, in which a form of consociational politics and elite negotiation imparted a transparent and legible (if tremendously hierarchical) order to one in which no dominant structure has emerged. Pillarisation (‘verzuiling’) was segregated and elitist and in many ways far from democratic – but it was predictable and shared and orderly. The nostalgia for that order and predictability linger.

More to the point, the system gave rise to a myth of quiet understanding, of understated transparency: the paradox was of a system in which you would argue that the rules were clear, yet this clarity was based mainly on implicit codes, rather than on explicit statement. The rules might have been obvious but they were rarely spelt out. The ‘nostalgic dream’ is in part nostalgia for a system that seemed to be transparent enough to necessitate little actual explanation.

An influx of immigrants not immediately attuned to the implicit rules and a transformation of professional and social structures (and attendant political views) creates problems. It does so because it demands that those in charge (of whatever institution) make explicit something that they deem implicit and, further, that they value in great part because of its implicitness. The reference to a ‘dream’ is no accident – what could be more comforting than to think that your fellow countrymen share your most intimate and implicit longings – your dreams.

In the case of the Netherlands, the problem is compounded by the fact that it would require being explicit about integrating into something that is felt to be largely lost and whose replacement is not yet fully specified.

The story of the Netherlands and its reluctant radicals is about what happens when you move from the implicit to the explicit while still mourning the loss of the ‘nostalgic dream’. The result in terms of the reluctant radicals is a strange combination of stridency and bombast, of lyricism and pragmatism, of egalitarianism and resentment. Above all, the Dutch reluctant radicals seem defined by their nostalgia, defined by the lost dream. For all the – no doubt honest – talk of ‘shaking up the system of consensus politics’, the shake-up is a turn to the past, rather than a turn forward to the future. The overall view amounts to one final paradox: a love and hatred of consensus. Support for Wilders is rooted in nostalgia for the ‘old’ form of consensus/consociational politics (the implicit one) but also stems from a refusal to accept the ‘new’ consensus politics, deemed illegitimate in part because these types of politics are about coming to a new explicit agreement – a de facto admission that the political community is no longer a natural one, but a constructed, almost ‘ersatz’ one.

This last point is significant in two further ways. First, because it sheds some light on the strength of anti-European feeling in the Netherlands (a powerful national driver long before the rise of LPF or Wilders). With elections looming (in under a month as we write) on 12 September 2012, the debate has shifted away from issues of multiculturalism and diversity and firmly towards Europe. Given the current crisis of European institutions this is hardly surprising, but it is still worth noting because the debate – and the ways in which Europe is being discussed by both the populist right and the populist left – casts it precisely as a constructed, imposed and therefore ‘illegitimate’ community.

This takes us to the second point of interest, which is that nostalgia cuts both right and left. While we have no doubt that the support for Wilders will remain relatively high in these elections, the rise of the populist Socialist party is striking. This rise rests on an appeal that is rooted in an anti-European, anti-elitist discourse.
that does not specifically address diversity or culture, but does specifically appeal to the sense of a lost, autonomous and resilient community. The point is that nostalgia – over and above the catchwords – is at the heart of populist mobilisation in the Netherlands, on both sides of the spectrum.

**Disillusionment and trauma**

According to Buruma, Fortuyn was a ‘trickster’, who tore up the rulebook of the ‘new’ Dutch politics and mocked the political elite. Wilders follows in his footsteps. His provocative statements and careful media management – rarely giving interviews and preferring to tweet his latest proclamations while his friends and enemies alike follow his doings avidly – mark him out as a political celebrity. He has presented himself as the defender of ordinary Dutch citizens – referring to the imaginary typical Dutch couple ‘Henk and Ingrid’ – from the metropolitan elite. Again, this is particularly interesting in light of the element of nostalgia: a tearing up of the rulebook that is in part resentment against an elite that has failed to restore the myth of the past. Support for Wilders is partly about mocking the elite, partly a mourning for elites past, and partly an attempt to conjure up the elite of the future in the absence of any natural – or perhaps implicitly acceptable – choices.

Wilders’ voters are disillusioned with the political establishment: 43 per cent of reluctant radicals trust the government compared to 64 per cent of the entire electorate. Potential radicals, too, express low levels of trust. Distrust in parliament is one factor that predicts the reluctant radical vote. It is also a factor in radicalising PVV voters further: PVV supporters who distrust parliament are more likely to be committed radicals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very much</th>
<th>Fairly much</th>
<th>Not so much</th>
<th>No trust at all</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential radical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant radical</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committed radical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010

Reluctant radicals feel that they have been betrayed by their elected representatives. Fifty-nine per cent disagree with the statement that politicians keep their promises, compared to (a still high) 48 per cent of the electorate. Political suspicion extends into wider social suspicion as well. Only 49 per cent of reluctant radicals believe most people can be trusted, compared to 64 per cent of the whole electorate. As with France, however, committed radicals appear to have their minds more made up than reluctant radicals: 28 per cent of reluctant radicals decided who to vote for on election day, compared to 4 per cent of committed radicals.

Fortuyn channelled the feeling that the mainstream parties had let voters down by ignoring concerns about immigration. While the mainstream parties converged – particularly on the issue of multiculturalism – Fortuyn spoke out. The disdain the political elite felt towards Fortuyn – Buruma describes how the Labour Party’s Ad Melkert struggled to recognise Fortuyn’s victory after his party did well in local elections in Rotterdam – compounded the feeling of shame from the Dutch establishment when he was murdered. After his death, Fortuyn was lauded...
by his followers as a national visionary. His reputation as a prophet was further enhanced after the death of controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh at the hands of an Islamic extremist. In the past few years Wilders has risen while the political establishment has held back for fear of further accusations.

The impact of the two murders cannot be overestimated both in terms of how it has allowed Wilders to behave as well as in terms of the reactions of mainstream politicians to this behaviour. The murder of Fortuyn plays a salient role in creating the impression that visionaries are an endangered species in the Netherlands. Further, his murder continues to act as an illustration of the dangers that come with an attitude that might stigmatise those who hold non-mainstream opinions.

The ease with which Wilders has done well is in part the price of an elite mea culpa: a sense that Fortuyn’s murder should serve as a reminder that marginalising – even with good reason – creates its own problems. It is a strange – but understandable – twist on Dutch political transparency that mainstream politicians are cowed by Wilders in part because opprobrium or disdain would be seen as a repeat of the Fortuyn saga (however inaccurate that may be).

Organisationally, Wilders has learnt from List Pim Fortuyn’s mistakes. After List Pim Fortuyn formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats and the VVD upon its electoral breakthrough, internal fighting and lack of leadership meant it struggled to govern. To avoid a repeat of this, Wilders has exerted a firm grip on his party. Local activity is minimal and PVV MPs have little say on party strategy. This tactic has proved effective, although recent scandals suggest it may have reached its limits. Wilders has picked up votes from across the political spectrum. Our analysis shows that 25 per cent of reluctant radicals who voted in the previous election in 2006 voted for the liberal conservative VVD and 19 per cent voted for the Christian democratic CDA, while 19 per cent voted for the centre-left PvdA and 16 per cent voted for the radical left SP – though the sample is small and therefore this serves only as a guide.

**Education: a striking cleavage**

Apart from the divide between ordinary people and the elite, right-wing populism in the Netherlands is characterised by a cleavage between the well educated and the poorly educated. Class has traditionally played a small role in the Netherlands (in fact the word is essentially shunned and a bit of a taboo), which prides itself on having an egalitarian culture. In fact, 51 per cent of the reluctant radicals define themselves as middle class, similar to the average figure for the electorate of 49 per cent. But, in recent years, cleavages between levels of education have fomented social divisions. As with other RPPs, reluctant and committed PVV supporters – as well as the Dutch potential radicals – are significantly more likely to be educated at a lower level than average. Only 10 per cent and 4 per cent of reluctant and committed radicals respectively have been to university (vocational or research), compared to 31 per cent of the whole electorate. This is one of the most distinctive demographic features of Wilders’ reluctant radicals. In contrast, the age profile of the reluctant radicals appears to be representative of the broader electorate and the reluctant radical gender gap is fairly small (52 per cent are men).
We also find that, similarly to France, people who have no income or whose main source of income is unemployment benefit are more likely to be reluctant radicals than non-PVV voters. This is in contrast to our results discussed in Chapter 2. Yet the unemployed, even when more likely to be reluctant radicals, still make up a small proportion of the total reluctant radical vote. The right-wing populist problem cannot be reduced to the issue of unemployment.

The PVV appears to have galvanised support in part by capitalising on the disillusionment and disdain felt towards the well-educated elite in a country where the gap is perceived as both inexcusable (because deeply at odds with an egalitarian myth) and growing. While Wilders is known for his rhetoric on the topic of immigration (and, more recently, Europe), the resentment he taps into appears to go beyond it. Wilders’ economic policy is somewhat incoherent, but he has repeatedly advocated lower taxes. Accordingly, those who believe in lower taxes are more likely than others to vote reluctantly for Wilders than not vote for him, even when controlling for gender, age, education level and other attitudes. The same holds for those who are against a higher retirement age, a key issue that contributed to Wilders bringing down the minority coalition last spring. Indeed, one Dutch reluctant radical, when asked why they voted for the PVV, answered:

*I largely agree with him, also disagree with many things. He appealed mostly to me on the elderly and the General Old Age Pensions Act.*

The PVV has shown itself to be far from a one-trick pony, able to mobilise support on a variety of core Dutch grievances.

Fortuyn’s ‘nostalgic dream’ binds these issues together, whether they amount to fears over the security, economic and cultural effects of immigration, the protection of the welfare of the elderly, or the opposition to further integration in the European Union. Wilders’ future depends on whether he can continue to mobilise voters on their longing for a distant, more secure past.

### Education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education level</th>
<th>Mainstream</th>
<th>Potential radical</th>
<th>Reluctant radical</th>
<th>Committed radical</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower vocational</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level vocational/higher level secondary</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher level vocational/university</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010
The ‘Big Bang’ in Finnish politics occurred on 17 April 2011. The True Finns, led by the charismatic Timo Soini, shockingly increased their share of the vote from 4 per cent to 19 per cent. Until then, a shift of this sort in Finnish politics was unheard of in a time of relative peace and stability. The victory rocked the Finnish political establishment. And European eyebrows were raised.

This was not, as some have suggested, a case of Finland turning fascist. The True Finns is a populist party whose main ire is directed towards EU policy – particularly, in recent years, the EU bailouts of southern European countries. That is not to say that the True Finns is necessarily epiphenomenal. Its roots are in the agrarian SMP (the Finnish Rural Party, which ruled in coalition in the 1980s) rather than neo-Nazism or neo-Fascism.

Given the limited amount of immigration and the already strict rules in operation in Finland, it is unsurprising that Soini has not – like other RPPs – focused campaigning on the issue of reducing immigration; however, a handful of MPs who are members of the anti-multiculturalism group Suomen Sisu have formed an anti-immigration wing within the True Finns. The True Finns, has advocated an explicitly populist, traditionalist and socially conservative programme, which, despite its centre-left economic leanings, mark it out as an RPP.

We use data from the 2011 Finnish National Election Study to explore reluctant radicals in Finland, just as we have done with respect to France and the Netherlands. Reluctant radicals are defined consistently with the rest.
of our analysis. Potential radicals are defined slightly differently: we look at those voters who did not vote for the True Finns, yet said that they considered doing so.

Shattering consensus above all
The most common reason the Finnish reluctant radicals (and, for that matter, the committed radicals) give for voting for the True Finns was their wish to shake up the party system. Thirty-three per cent say their main reason for voting for the True Finns was to generate change. One Finnish reluctant radical, asked why he voted for the True Finns, explained: ‘Protest. The other parties have messed up in equal measure.’

Like in the Netherlands, the Finnish political model has been based on consensus and coalition. And, much as in the Netherlands – though for vastly different reasons – the relationship towards consensus is a love/hate one. This is all the more so given that consensus is at once associated with stability, the capacity to overcome past economic recessions (such as in the early 1990s) and recent prosperity and development – while at the same time is held up as a default Finnish political style, which accounts for much of the discomfort associated with the era of Soviet dominance.

The sense that many of the key discussions take place behind closed doors where parties hash out compromises, among a tight circle of people who have often been to school, and to university together, and who know each other and each other’s friends intimately, in the context of a total population of 5.3 million, can easily fuel the suspicion that the prevailing modus operandi is not so much a consensus as a stitch-up. The True Finns has shattered this consensus politics. Before the election, the party positioned itself as against the status quo; after it, Soini cemented his outsider position further by taking the unusual step of refusing to join in coalition with the other winning parties.

Other factors seem to play much less of a role for the reluctant radicals – Euroscepticism, immigration and the Finnish party funding scandal in 2011 do not seem terribly significant. Yet, interestingly, differences do emerge between the reluctant and committed radicals. According to our regression analysis, those – few – True Finns voters for whom immigration was an important factor in deciding their vote are more likely to be committed radicals than reluctant radicals. In fact, 51 per cent of committed radicals (representing 48 per cent of the True Finns vote) say that a desire to tighten the immigration system and immigration benefits was a decisive factor in their choice, compared to only 29 per cent of reluctant radicals. This suggests that immigration is a much stronger motivating issue for the committed radicals than for the reluctant radicals (though, even for the committed radicals, immigration, or the threat of immigration, does not appear to be of overwhelming importance).

Regression analysis, on the other hand, suggests that people who express distrust in the EU and people who favour referendums for important national decisions are more likely to vote reluctantly for the True Finns rather than vote for someone else or abstain. Frustration with political elites appears to play an important role in motivating the reluctant radicals to vote. But this account only scratches the surface of the True Finns’ rise.

Rural roots and fear of change
A deeper explanation is put forward by the academic Timo Toivonen, who draws a parallel between the rise of the True Finns and the success of the populist Finnish Rural Party (SMP) in the 1970 parliamentary elections.
In 1970 the SMP won 10.1 per cent of the vote. Using ecological analyses, Toivonen argues that, just as the vote for the SMP was a protest by those working in agriculture against the fast pace of Finnish industrialisation, so the vote for the True Finns is a protest by workers in the manufacturing and construction industry against Finland’s rapid transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial, technology-led society. To put it differently, the True Finns vote may be seen as a manifestation of a crisis of modernity.

Toivonen’s theory is augmented by research by Kimmo Grönlund, who analyses the opinions of True Finns voters along a number of cleavages in Finnish party politics. His findings indicate that they are significantly more (a) nationalist, (b) traditionalist, (c) receptive to attaching importance to ‘ordinary people’, (d) partial to one national language rather than two, and (e) willing to prioritise economic growth over environmental issues. On many issues – particularly on the subjects of ‘ordinary people’, traditionalism and environmentalism – they differ notably from the VIHR, the Green League. This suggests that in part the True Finns represent a backlash against structural developments in post-industrial Finnish society, a counterpoint to the post-materialists’ promotion of internationalism, environmentalism and multiculturalism, politically embodied in the European green parties.

The scale and pace of change in Finland can be neither overemphasised nor overestimated. In many respects, Finland has more in common with the transition countries to its east, than with Europe to its west. The extraordinary success story is such, though, that the nearness of a rougher, much more precarious and much less innovative way of life can easily be forgotten. In just over 20 years Finland has re-invented itself as a tech mecca, a European power, a design and innovation hub, a sophisticated culinary destination and the world’s top-rated education powerhouse. In the midst of this transformation it retains its traditional attachments – to nature (the return to which is mandatory over the summer months), to the enjoyment of basic physical comforts that play a particular role in its community life, to excellence in classical music.

This tension between a bustling present of excellence and excitement and a very near past of forbearance and adversity gives rise to a complex and hybrid polity in which some members feel acutely marginalised. There seems little room left for the habits and values that thrived and were necessary to life under previous conditions: silent masculinity, strength, stoicism, restorative solitude and, in the context of a complex geo-political situation, discretion. How do these get channelled in a hyper-connected, hyper-social world in which adaptability and innovation are valued above everything else? It is this fringe of the population that the True Finns have tapped into particularly effectively. These reluctant radicals are above all modern and alienated.

They may be true, but they’re not young

The ‘crisis of modernity’ thesis does not mean that the ‘typical profile’ is right for the True Finns, though. In fact what is interesting is how an explanation as ubiquitous as a crisis of modernity (though no less true for that) can find such differing expressions. Analysis from Juho Rahkonen, Research Manager at the Finnish market research company Taloustutkimus Oy, shows that the typical True Finns voter is a middle-aged working-class man who earns a decent salary. Rahkonen explains:

When I think about a typical True Finn Party voter, I do not imagine an angry skinhead yelling at foreigners. Rather, I see a
group of red-necked middle-age men sitting in a village bar with their caps and a little bit dirty shirts.77

Our analysis of the Finnish reluctant radicals supports this profile. Reluctant True Finns supporters tend to be working class and middle aged: 38 per cent identify as working class, whereas for the total electorate the figure is 29 per cent. Thirty-five per cent are aged between 50 and 64, compared to 23 per cent of the whole electorate. (Committed radicals are more likely to be aged between 35 and 49.) The gender gap is in fact quite small – 54 per cent male – but, as with many other countries in our study, there is a large gap with respect to the committed radicals, 64 per cent of whom are men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age distribution within the Finnish electorate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18–24</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potential radical</td>
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<td>Reluctant radical</td>
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<td>Committed radical</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Finnish National Election Study 2011

A crisis of modernity and masculinity?
The predominance of men – if not within the reluctant radicals then within True Finns voters as a whole – gives us reason to believe that, as a number of people we spoke with suggested, the True Finns vote is both a manifestation of a ‘crisis of modernity’ and a ‘crisis of masculinity’.78 Committed radicals are more likely than average to think that men are better decision-makers than women and both committed and reluctant radicals are more likely to think that male MPs would be better than female MPs at working on economic and immigration policy. This could be explained with reference to the ‘crisis of modernity’ theory – the advance of gender equality is one of the many aspects of modernisation against which the True Finns are a reaction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender distribution within the Finnish electorate</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
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<td>Committed radical</td>
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<td>All</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Finnish National Election Study 2011

Does this theory hold across the other countries in our study? With respect to France, John Veugelers argues that the theory (what he calls PMT or post-materialist theory) does not hold because the social and attitudinal profile of the FN electorate is not consistent with PMT.79 The same could be said of the PVV, whose voters, despite their nostalgia, are markedly liberal when it comes to issues such as gay rights. Therefore, the ‘crisis of modernity’ should not be applied too liberally to other Western European countries. In fact, a divide between Finland and the rest of Western Europe would not be surprising given the disproportionate pace of structural change in Finland over recent decades.

The ‘Big Bang’ has transformed the Finnish political landscape. If the ‘crisis of modernity’ ignited it, reaching out to the reluctant radicals provides the best hope of a stable aftermath.
Warnings and recommendations

Our analysis in the last four chapters has given us an insight into the profile of Europe’s reluctant radicals – their demographics, their attitudes, and their motivations. We now turn to how our study can inform the outlook and planning of mainstream politicians and policy-makers in the context of a better public understanding of the support for right-wing populist parties (RPPs).

Everything to play for

Our main recommendation, as we draw this first phase of research to a close, is to avoid the alarmism and relentless pessimism of most of the coverage and research in this domain. The support for RPPs is worrying and their impact on institutions both national and European is negative and undermining. As for their impact on minorities and community relations, it is deleterious. But our focus on the reluctant radicals demonstrates that the bulk of support for these parties is neither stable nor fixed – which means that mainstream politicians still have the opportunity to reach out to these reluctants and bring them back to the mainstream. Europe has everything to play for here – it should fight to recapture its reluctant radicals.

Some alternative strategies but only one winning strategy

There are, roughly, four alternatives available to the mainstream in dealing with RPPs.
They can ostracise them and stigmatise them (for instance, by putting in place a ‘cordon sanitaire’ whereby mainstream parties refuse to cooperate politically with RPPs, such as with Vlaams Belang in Belgium or the Sweden Democrats) or avoid debating certain issues that RPPs make salient. The risk is of strengthening the solidarity among activists and allowing them to develop a martyr complex.\(^\text{80}\)

They can compete. In recent years, both mainstream right and mainstream left parties have at times tried to compete on the same turf as RPPs, adopting tough policies on immigration, Islam and crime to tempt voters back into the mainstream (Sarkozy in the 2012 presidential election). But there is evidence that coverage of the agenda of the populist right in the manifestos of mainstream parties can have a legitimising effect on RPPs.\(^\text{81}\) Cas Mudde argues that the effect depends on who has ‘issue ownership’ – if the RPP owns the issue of immigration, for instance, then there is little the mainstream right can do to compete on the same ground.\(^\text{82}\) In any case, this scenario is unappealing, since objectionable policies do not become acceptable by virtue of their being promoted by mainstream parties rather than RPPs.

They can cooperate. In a number of European countries, mainstream parties have openly cooperated with RPPs, whether through forming coalitions or depending on their support to pass legislation. The success of this strategy depends on the type of cooperation. Often when RPPs become parties of government, they struggle (e.g. the FPÖ in Austria and the LPF in the Netherlands). Yet this can be deeply problematic for political institutions in the short-term, and even in the long-term does not guarantee that RPPs will not regain electoral strength once having left government, as with the FPÖ. RPPs tend to do better when supporting minority administrations, as with the Danish People’s Party and the PVV. Here these parties have benefited from the best of both worlds: seeing their policies implemented without taking on the responsibility of governing.

Our research suggests that we should adopt a fourth, much more effective strategy – Recapturing the reluctant radicals.

This scenario consists of mainstream parties reaching out to the ‘reluctant radicals’ without embracing right-wing populist policies. We suggest that this is the optimum alternative for the mainstream because the reluctant radicals are the RPP voters who are easiest to win back, and their recapturing will severely undermine RPPs. Our analysis has supported this argument, in general showing that those with anti-immigration or anti-Islam views are more likely to be committed radicals than reluctant radicals, and indicating (in France and the Netherlands, at least) that reluctant radicals tend to take longer than committed radicals to make up their minds about who to vote for. Of course, reaching out to the reluctant radicals is easier said than done. For the remainder of this section, we lay out recommendations that we believe should be a part of the ‘recapturing’ agenda.

Looking beyond generic headlines
One of the key messages from our research – and from the project as a whole – is that there is mileage in understanding and analysing the specific context in which issues emerge. Anti-Europeanism, anti-elitism, or anti-immigration views are hallmarks of right-wing populist politics, but tackling them generically is both ethically (for progressives) and practically difficult. These attitudes are symptomatic of a world in flux and,
therefore, while complex, they are also somewhat
generic – a trait that both these RPPs and the media
thrive on – they make for good sound-bites and allow
for easy mobilisation.

Our research suggests that understanding – and
acting on – the specific historical, cultural and emotional
springs of the surface mobilisation against Europe or
immigration would allow policy-makers to make a more
appealing and, above all, more implementable offer to the
reluctant radicals. Offering remedies that address the
specifics of Dutch nostalgia, of French disconnection
or Finnish alienation (to take but our three case studies,
that can no doubt be filled out and amended) stands to
be much more effective than pretending to be able to
‘stop immigration’, or completely withdraw from the
European project. Delving beneath surface demands
to take into account cultural specificity is a much more
winning strategy in the end.

A caveat and a warning: diversity cuts both ways
Our research shows that support for RPPs is diverse
and fluctuating – this means that one-size policies will
seldom fit all. We have concentrated on the reluctant
radicals as a segment on which it is worth expending
political energy and policy capital. But even in that
category we find a diverse population. Yes, there are
some clear trends and a silhouette does emerge – but it
is a nuanced one, vulnerable to developments in national
and international politics. The fact that mainstream
politicians and policy-makers are dealing with a relatively
volatile population works to their advantage (they are the
‘voters with changeable minds’), but can also work to
their disadvantage: they may be unpredictable. Further,
this diversity is even more striking at a European level
– national political cultures, traumas, memories and
traditions shape this population in ways that compel the
mainstream to work with nuance.

Having said this – here are some recommendations
that can be applied (in various forms) cross-nationally.

Let’s not be ageist
Some have been tempted to respond to the right-wing
populist threat by arguing for a policy targeted at
disadvantaged young men. This may lead to policy
recommendations such as the introduction of a national
citizens’ service to temper the volatile temperament of
bored young men.

But this would be a one-size-fits-all approach. We
have seen that the gender gap for reluctant radicals is
often small and that in some countries reluctant radicals
are more likely than average to be middle aged or older.
Even when unemployment is associated with reluctant
radicalism, the unemployed constitute up to only around
10–20 per cent of reluctant radicals, leaving at least 80
per cent not directly affected by a policy targeting those
looking for work. Any policy response should therefore
cast its net wider and look beyond the young, male and
disadvantaged. It needs to recognise the diversity of the
reluctant radicals.

Focus on education
Our research has shown that a consistent feature of
reluctant radicals is a low level of education. To bring
them back to the fold there is only one long-term
strategy worth investing in: invest in education. While
this may seem generic, the numbers show a direct
correlation between declining support and higher levels
of education.
The value of a very general education?
In France, passing the baccalaureate appears to be a significant breakpoint – reluctant radicals are less likely than average to have the baccalaureate and more likely than average to be educated at a lower level. We suggest that further investment is needed in order to actively encourage all to pursue a baccalaureate qualification.

While the breakpoint is not as obvious in other countries, we suggest that it is worth exploring the potential impact of a basic level of very general education – such as the baccalaureat – on political awareness. This may run counter to the current fascination with vocational training, but our research suggests that a general education (rather than one in which specialisation is encouraged at an early stage) might inoculate – in part – against supporting an RPP.

Support for university places
We have found across most countries in our study that going to university decreases the likelihood of being a reluctant radical. Higher education – whether it is down to encouraging people to mix with others, to question received opinion, or to debate and interact in a friendly environment – also appears to be a powerful inoculation against populist politics. Encouraging students from poorer backgrounds to attend university by offering larger subsidies can help to defend mainstream politics from the right-wing populist challenge.

Focus on women
It has been received wisdom that women don’t support RPPs. Our research shows that, Finland aside, the gender gap in support for these parties is narrowing. Our sense is that women are potentially the next obvious target for RPPs. Mainstream parties need to pay attention to the specific policy requirements of women who are the most vulnerable of potential radical groups.

Older, less well-educated men and women tend to be potential radicals. This group should not be forgotten – if they turn to RPPs then the power of right-wing populism will be significantly increased. This group has tended to maintain links with the mainstream, but centre parties should make efforts to reassure these voters – in particular with regard to issues such as the raising of the pension age. Sending out clearer signals on these complex policy issues could help to short-circuit any attempts by right-wing populist actors to win over these crucial voters.

A commitment to having the difficult conversations
Inspired by Quebec’s Bouchard–Taylor Commission of 2008, for the third stage of the ‘Reluctant Radicals’ project we will design and implement prototype public consultations in France, the Netherlands and Finland. These face-to-face interactions will be an opportunity both to gain insights into the political challenges and grievances facing communities in these countries and to engage in a positive and fruitful dialogue on these issues. We hope that this will provide a model for an innovative method of re-engaging citizens with political institutions and yield guidelines that can help various policy actors and institutions develop capacity in consultation and deliberative democracy.

This takes us to the thorny subject of immigration. There is no doubt that anti-immigration views correlate with support for these parties (Finland and Hungary perhaps being exceptions). It is an important, unavoidable topic and our suggestion is that it needs to be treated as a one of the difficult conversations that need to be had. Rather than taking a top-down, conceptual approach, attempting to reshape a nation’s identity by tackling the
Recapturing the Reluctant Radical

project head-on, we suggest it is more fruitful to ask how to appropriately balance the specific and conflicting concerns of citizens with different belief systems, traditions and practices within a pluralistic framework through a bottom-up approach, engaging with citizens at a local level on matters of particular controversy.

**Invest in infrastructure and services**

Across the political spectrum, an economic case has been made for European economies to invest more in infrastructure. There is also a social and political case. We have explored how in France, reluctant radicals tend to be located in rural areas, where pressure on public services has increased. Stronger transport links and improved community centres, for instance, could help to prevent the social exclusion of the French reluctant radicals. The issue is also relevant across Europe where, in many places, housing pressures are driving people to live in over crowded neighbourhoods (thereby creating pressures on services) or further and further afield (thereby creating the sense of disconnection and abandonment we identified in France). Public services – and the egalitarian commitment they represent – are one of the hallmarks of European polities and of the European space. Vacating (literally) this space is an opportunity for RPPs.

**A renewed engagement with Europe**

Much of the disdain towards political institutions from RPPs is currently being directed at the EU. In Finland, distrust in the EU appears to fuel reluctant radicalism, while the September 2012 Dutch elections are largely being fought as a referendum on Europe. As for British Eurosceptics, they seem to be drawn to be reluctant supporters of UKIP and the BNP. Clarifying and outlining the benefits and burdens, the opportunities and challenges, of EU membership, and making a renewed case for the importance of an accountable and transparent European Union, could help to quell some of the suspicion directed towards it.

In this pamphlet, we have confronted some of the common assumptions about right-wing populism: that it is currently on the rise; that it is dominated by impoverished young men; and that it is not the reluctant radicals but the committed core of RPP supporters who pose the real threat. The main aim of this pamphlet has been to refocus concern about right-wing populism onto the reluctant radicals. For our part in this challenge, we are developing three public consultations in communities with high numbers of reluctant radicals to explore their political grievances. We are also commissioning expert-written pamphlets in ten European countries to gain a richer understanding of the emergence of right-wing populism within the appropriate cultural context. We hope that we have done enough for others to agree that the focus on Europe’s reluctant radicals is warranted.
Annexe: Methodology

As explained in earlier chapters, for each dataset we used, we divided respondents into four categories: committed radicals, reluctant radicals, potential radicals and the mainstream. We used broadly the same approach for each dataset.

For the European Social Survey, we pooled data from the five rounds to run the logistic regressions and used data from round 5 for the contingency tables. We included in our regression analysis only those rounds where people voted for RPPs. This meant excluding rounds 1 and 2 for Hungary, rounds 1 to 3 for the Netherlands, and rounds 1 to 4 for Sweden. We also excluded rounds 1 to 4 for Finland and rounds 1 and 2 for France due to the education level variable for these rounds not being harmonised.

When using contingency tables, we applied a design weight. In each round of the European Social Survey, we defined RPP voters as those who answered the question ‘Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?’ by giving the name of an RPP. We defined committed radicals as RPP voters who answered the questions ‘Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?’ and ‘How close do you feel to this party? Do you feel that you are...?’ by giving the name of an RPP and saying they were quite close or very close to it. For this part of the analysis, RPPs include the following parties: Die Republikaner, the National Democratic Party, the
German People’s Union, the Danish People’s Party, the True Finns, the Front National, the Mouvement National Républicain, Jobbik, MIÉP, PVV (List Wilders), the Norwegian Progress Party and the Sweden Democrats.

We defined potential radicals by taking the average score on a 1–4 scale of the answers to the questions ‘Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here?’, ‘How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people?’ and ‘How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?’ Respondents with stronger anti-immigration views received higher scores.

Respondents who had scores of higher than 3 on this measure and who were not RPP voters were included within the potential radical category.

For the British Election Study 2010, we defined BNP / UKIP voters as those who answered ‘BNP’ / ‘UKIP’ to the question ‘Which party did you vote for in the General Election?’ We defined committed BNP / UKIP radicals as BNP / UKIP voters who answered ‘BNP’ / ‘UKIP’ to either the question ‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?’ or ‘Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others? Please say here which party this is.’ and who answered ‘very strongly’ or ‘fairly strongly’ to the question ‘Would you call yourself very strong, fairly strong, or not very strong?’ BNP and UKIP supporters were defined separately rather than aggregated together, owing to the different natures of the two parties.

We defined potential radicals as those non-BNP / UKIP voters who said they were ‘afraid’ when asked ‘Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about immigration?’ (Respondents could tick up to four options out of ‘angry’, ‘happy’, ‘disgusted’, ‘hopeful’, ‘uneasy’, ‘confident’, ‘afraid’ or ‘proud.’) We weighted the data by the standard weight variable for the full sample.

For the ITANES 2008, we defined Lega Nord voters as those who answered ‘Lega Nord’ to the question ‘Mi può dire per quale partito ha votato alla Camera?’ We defined committed radicals as Lega Nord voters who answered ‘Si’ to the question ‘C’è un partito politico al quale Lei si sente più vicino rispetto agli altri?’ followed by ‘Abbastanza vicino’ or ‘Molto vicino’ to the question ‘Rispetto a questo partito, Lei si sente:’ and ‘Lega Nord’ to the question ‘Può indicare qual è questo partito?’

We defined potential radicals by taking the average score on a 1–4 scale of the answers to the two questions ‘Le leggerò ora alcune affermazioni su politica ed economia che vengono fatte correntemente. Mi dica per ognuna se lei è per niente, poco, abbastanza o molto d’accordo. Gli immigrati sono un pericolo per la nostra cultura’ and ‘Gli immigrati sono un pericolo per l’occupazione (si intende l’occupazione degli italiani.)’ Respondents with stronger anti-immigration views received higher scores. Respondents who had scores of higher than 3 on this measure and who were not Lega Nord voters were included within the potential radical category. We included only respondents from the North-West, the North-East and ‘la Zona Rossa’ in the analysis.

For the PEF 2012, we defined Front National voters as those who answered ‘Marine Le Pen’ to the question ‘Pour quel candidat avez-vous voté?’ [referring to the first round of the 2012 presidential election]. We defined committed radicals as Front National voters who answered ‘Très proche’ or ‘Assez proche’ to the question ‘Diriez-vous que vous êtes habituellement... d’un parti politique en particulier?’ and ‘Front National’ to the question ‘Voici une liste de partis ou de mouvements politiques. Duquel vous sentez-vous le plus proche ou disons le moins éloigné?’
We defined potential radicals by taking the average score on a 1–4 scale of the answers to the four questions ‘Voici maintenant une liste de phrases. Pour chacune d’elles vous me direz si vous êtes tout à fait, plutôt, plutôt pas ou pas d’accord du tout? Il faudrait rétablir la peine de mort. Il y a trop d’immigrés en France. On ne se sent en sécurité nulle part’ and ‘Voici maintenant une liste de propositions. Pour chacune d’elles, vous me direz si vous êtes tout à fait d’accord, plutôt d’accord, plutôt pas d’accord ou pas d’accord du tout? L’abandon de l’euro.’ The lower the score, the more the respondent’s views fell in line with the Front National’s ideas. Respondents who had scores of lower than 2 on this measure and who were not Front National voters were included within the potential radical category. Data was weighted by a socio-demographic and political weight.

For the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010, we defined PVV voters as those who answered ‘Partij voor de Vrijheid (Geert Wilders)’ to the question ‘Op welke partij hebt u gestemd?’ We defined committed radicals as PVV voters who answered ‘Ja’ to either ‘Vindt u zichzelf aanhanger van een bepaalde politieke partij?’ or ‘Voelt u zich meer aangetrokken tot één van de politieke partijen dan tot andere?’ and then answered ‘Partij voor de Vrijheid (Geert Wilders)’ to either the question ‘Van welke politieke partij bent u een aanhanger?’ or ‘Tot welke partij voelt u zich aangetrokken?’ We defined potential radicals as respondents who are not PVV voters but who gave the same response on a 7-point scale to the questions ‘In Nederland vinden sommigen dat allochtonen hier moeten kunnen leven met behoud van de eigen cultuur. Anderen vinden dat zij zich geheel moeten aanpassen aan de Nederlandse cultuur. Waar zou u het [PVV] plaatsen op een lijn van 1 tot en met 7, waarbij de 1 behoud van eigen cultuur voor allochtonen betekent en de 7 dat zij zich geheel moeten aanpassen? En hoe zou u uzelf op die lijn plaatsen?’ Data was weighted by a socio-demographic weight.

For the Finnish National Election Study 2011, we defined True Finns voters as those who answered ‘True Finns’ to the question ‘The candidate of which party (or political group) did you vote for in these parliamentary elections?’ We defined committed radicals as True Finns voters who answered ‘True Finns’ to the question ‘Which party do you feel closest to?’ and ‘very close’ or ‘somewhat close’ to the question ‘Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?’

We defined potential radicals slightly differently to the other cases. We included non-voters who answered ‘True Finns’ to the question ‘If you had voted, the candidate of which party would you have voted for?’ (Multiple mentions were allowed.) We also included voters who answered ‘Yes’ to the question ‘Did you consider voting for a candidate of any other party or group?’ and ‘True Finns’ to the question ‘Which party/ parties or group(s)?’ (Multiple mentions were allowed.)

For each of the surveys we used, we defined reluctant radicals as RPP voters who were not committed radicals. When analysing the contingency tables, we applied chi-square tests and looked for standardised adjusted residuals with absolute values greater than 2 to test for associations. We used unweighted data when running the logistic regressions. Full details of the cross-tabulations and the logistic regressions – including full specifications of the models used – will be posted on our website.

The following table gives the sample sizes for each survey.
Recapturing the Reluctant Radical

Sample sizes across datasets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mainstream</th>
<th>Potential radical</th>
<th>Reluctant radical</th>
<th>Committed radical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESS – Germany</td>
<td>9478 (2001)</td>
<td>1290 (214)</td>
<td>65 (15)</td>
<td>25 (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS – Denmark</td>
<td>5489 (1093)</td>
<td>335 (45)</td>
<td>289 (65)</td>
<td>219 (63)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS – Finland (round 5 only)</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS – France (rounds 3–5 only)</td>
<td>3668 (1129)</td>
<td>554 (166)</td>
<td>114 (32)</td>
<td>39 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS – Hungary (rounds 3–5 only)</td>
<td>2181 (783)</td>
<td>1066 (314)</td>
<td>44 (39)</td>
<td>66 (59)</td>
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<td>ESS – Netherlands (rounds 4 and 5 only)</td>
<td>2749 (1334)</td>
<td>265 (53)</td>
<td>112 (9)</td>
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<td>227 (43)</td>
<td>527 (97)</td>
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<td>ITANES 2008</td>
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<td>1874</td>
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<td>Finnish National Election Study 2011</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ESS: unless otherwise specified, numbers include rounds 1 to 5. Bracketed numbers indicate round 5.

Limitations
Most of the datasets we used had small sample sizes with respect to the right-wing populist vote, so we suggest caution should be exercised when interpreting these results. Particular caution should be taken with respect to the ‘Committed radicals’ figures, since, as seen in the above table, generally the samples here are smallest.

We also advise care when comparing the different datasets, since different questions and sampling techniques were used for the different data. We aim to restrict ourselves to indirect qualitative comparisons in this pamphlet, and suggest that any direct comparisons should be applied only to the results from the European Social Survey, which is designed for cross-country comparisons.
‘EU leader Van Rompuy sees “populist” threat to Schengen’; and ‘Nick Clegg on the EU’

Stratfor, ‘Nationalism, populism and the collapse of the EU’

Alderman, ‘Greek far right hangs a target on immigrants’

Stanley, ‘Marine Le Pen: neither left nor right, just a chain-smoking, race-baiting opportunist’

Goodspeed, ‘Flirting with fascism: why Europe can’t shake its weakness for nazism’

‘Greek far-right Golden Dawn MP wanted for assault’

Pidd, ‘Poor, abused and second-class: the Roma living in fear in Hungarian village’

Taylor, ‘English Defence League: inside the violent world of Britain’s new far right’

White, ‘Dealing with concerns of young men after life in the military’

Wieder, ‘Marine Le Pen pourrait arriver en tête chez les jeunes’; and Skyring, ‘Far-right Freedom Party most popular among young Austrians’

Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, *The New Face of Digital Populism*

For a fuller analysis of the term ‘populism’ and how it can be applied to different movements, see Fieschi, ‘A plague on both your populisms’; and Fieschi, ‘Trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics’.

Hooper, ‘Umberto Bossi resigns as leader of Northern League amid funding scandal’

In the graph comparing election results pre- and post-crisis, we define pre-crisis up to the end of 2009 and post-crisis from 2010 onwards. For Austria, Norway and Italy we use recent poll results rather than election results, as these are not available. The Austrian poll is from http://neuwal.com/ (last accessed 15 Aug 12), the Norwegian poll is from ‘Ap faller dramatisk’, siste.no (poll conducted by Opinion Perduco); the Italian poll
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is from www.archivio.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/ (poll conducted 19 Jun 2012). The election results are obtained from the European Election Database, with the exception of the Greek Golden Dawn 2009 result, which is obtained from Spillius, ‘Greek immigrants urge parties to isolate far-right Golden Dawn’. Elections referred to are all parliamentary, apart from France, where the figures refer to presidential elections.

15 Bartlett, Birdwell and Littler, The New Face of Digital Populism

16 Goodwin and Evans, From Voting to Violence

17 A series of brutal murders over the past year have brought this point home – beginning with the Anders Breivik shootings in Utøya and the bombing in Oslo, followed by the revelations in Germany surrounding a murderous neo-Nazi cell and the shooting of two Senegalese street vendors in Florence by a Casa Pound sympathiser. If the committed supporters are the ones most likely to turn to violence, as the Chatham House report we have mentioned suggested, then surely, some argue, these are the people mainstream policy-makers should be worried about.

18 Mayer and Perrineau, ‘Why do they vote for Le Pen?’

19 Gombin, ‘Is there such a thing as extreme right voters? The case of the French Front National’

20 Our use of the term ‘radical’ in this pamphlet captures only the fact that the people we are concerned with have voted for (or will potentially vote for) a party outside the mainstream. We are not suggesting that the reluctant radicals are anti-democratic extremists, or that they are connected to left-wing anti-establishment radicalism.

21 A good example of this thinking can be found in Goodhart and O’Leary, ‘Welcome to the post-liberal majority’.

22 ‘Est-ainsi que les hommes votent?’; see also the year-long blog www.lemonde.fr/une-annee-en-france/

23 Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe

24 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter

25 Evans, Voters and Voting: An Introduction, p. 64

26 With the exception of Finland; see Chapter 5.

27 Ivarsflaten, ‘What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases’

28 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, section 3.2.2

29 We include only Northern Italy in the analysis since the Italian RPP we study, Lega Nord, is a regionalist party of the North.

30 We also control for the differences across the different rounds of the ESS.

31 Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’

32 See Chapter 5 for an explanation for why the True Finns is male dominated.

33 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, p. 113

34 See, for example, Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, ‘Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe’; and Arzheimer, ‘Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002’

35 Particular caution should be applied to the result for Germany, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.

36 Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’

37 Bartlett, Birdwell, Krekó, Benfield and Gyori, Populism in Europe: Hungary

38 Oesch, ‘Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland’; and Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’

39 Using the ISCO-88 categorisation, craft and related trade workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations are classified as blue-collar workers.

40 Caution should be applied to this result, since the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested a poor fit; however, the model was a better fit when the gender variable was removed.

41 In Italy, we were unable to include unemployment within our model.

42 For the analysis of the British reluctant radicals, unfortunately we were unable to include a variable on extreme-right ideology.

43 Particular caution should be applied to the results for Denmark and Norway, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.

44 See, for example, Oesch, ‘Explaining workers’ support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway and Switzerland’; and Lucassen and Lubbers, ‘Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats’

45 We did not have comparable variables for Britain, but found that anger over immigration increased the likelihood of being a reluctant BNP supporter and of being a reluctant UKIP supporter.
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Betz, ‘The new politics of resentment: radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe’

Particular caution should be applied to the result for Germany, where the Hosmer–Lemeshow test suggested the model was a poor fit.

Perrineau, ‘Marine Le Pen: voter pour une nouvelle extreme droite’, p. 32

‘Dédiabolisation’

Arzheimer, ‘Electoral sociology: who votes for the extreme right and why – and when?’

See Turchi, ‘How Sarkozy’s UMP gave legitimacy to the far-right Front National’

Mayer, ‘Le Pen’s comeback: the 2002 French presidential election’

Bauman, Liquid Modernity, p. 109

Lehingue, ‘Les conglomérats électoraux frontistes: pistes de recherche’

Veugelers, ‘Social cleavage and the revival of far right parties: the case of France’s National Front’

See Helen Lewis’ Shame and Guilt in Neurosis, and her analysis of the shame and anger loop and reference to ‘feeling traps’.

Our interpretation in this chapter is influenced by conversations with a number of different Dutch researchers and activists, representing a diverse range of views. They include Yvonne Zonderop, Farid Tabarki, Sarah De Lange, Willem Wagenaar, Rene Danen, Frans Timmermans and Mark Dechesne.

Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 67

Akkerman, ‘Anti-immigration parties and the defence of liberal values: the exceptional case of the List Pim Fortuyn’

Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 66

Mair, ‘Electoral volatility and the Dutch political system’; and Daalders, ‘The Netherlands: still a consociational democracy?’

Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam, p. 62

See van Kessel, ‘Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties: the Netherlands as a case study’

Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam

van Kessel, ‘Explaining the electoral performance of populist parties: the Netherlands as a case study’

Partij voor de Vrijheid, Hún Brussel, óns Nederland. Verkiezingsprogramma 2012–2017

Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010

Timo Soini announced last year that the English version of the name of the party had changed from True Finns to The Finns. We stick to True Finns here because it is a better English translation of the Finnish ‘Perussuomalaiset’.

Railo and Vares, The Many Faces of Populism

‘Jussi Halla-aho’s successor to be determined next week’

True Finns, ‘Fitting for the Finns – the True Finns’ election programme for the parliamentary election 2011 / Summary’

Finnish National Election Study 2011

Toivonen, ‘An historical perspective on The Finns party support’

Grönlund, ‘Determinants of choosing The Finns party in the election of 2011’

Ignazi, ‘The silent counter-revolution’

Rahkonen, ‘National election surveys and the supporters of the True Finns party’

We thank Rauli Mickelsson for this idea.

Veugelers, ‘Right-wing extremism in contemporary France: a “silent counterrevolution”?’

See Goodwin, Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe

Arzheimer, ‘Contextual factors and the extreme right vote in Western Europe, 1980–2002’

Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

See Bouchard and Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation

See http://counterpoint.uk.com/research-projects/reluctant-radicals-2/
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**Britain**

**Italy**

**France**
PEF 2012. The data for the post-electoral research on the presidential election of 2012 was generated by CEVIPOF. The research was carried out by OpinionWay. The data will be held for consultation at the Sciences Po Centre for Socio-Political Data.
The Netherlands
Stichting Kiezersonderzoek Nederland – SKON; Centraal Bureau voor
de Statistiek – CBS; Henk van der Kolk – Universiteit Twente; Kees Aarts
– Universiteit Twente; Jean Tillie – Universiteit van Amsterdam (21 June
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Please make sure logo fits in bottom left corner of debossed front cover.
Support for right-wing populism in Europe has steadily gained attention from media and policymakers over the past decade. Most of this attention, however, has been focused on the core supporters of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) – the members and the street activists – at the expense of the topic of this publication, the ‘reluctant radicals’. These are our main protagonists: the soft, uncommitted supporters of RPPs. They are crucial for two straightforward reasons: the reluctant radicals are the bulk of RPP support as well as those who can most easily be brought back to the mainstream, thereby depriving RPPs of their main electoral base.

This publication is the first of a series produced within Counterpoint’s project ‘Recapturing Europe’s Reluctant Radicals’. Our aim here is to draw an accurate portrait of these voters by exploring the characteristics of the reluctant radicals in ten European countries, with a particular focus on France, Finland and the Netherlands. We aim to critically test some common assumptions – in particular, that right-wing populism is the preserve of disadvantaged young men – as well as outline the contours of the political and cultural context in which the data needs to be interpreted.

The result is a better understanding of the diversity of the support for these parties as well as a more accurate reading of the context in which they arise – the histories, traumas, memories, resentments and fears that drive the choices of the reluctant radicals.